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INTRODUCTION
For much of this century, American foreign affairs law has as

sumed that there is a sharp distinction between what is foreign and
what is domestic, between what is external and what is internal.

This assumption underlies a dual regime of constitutional law, in
which federal regulation of foreign affairs is subject to a different,
and generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than fed

eral regulation of domestic affairs. In what is perhaps its most fa

mous endorsement of this proposition, the Supreme Court stated in

1936 that "the federal power over external affairs [is] in origin and
essential character different from that over internal affairs."1 For a
variety of reasons, however, the distinction between domestic and
foreign affairs has been eroding in recent years, and this trend is
likely to continue.2 As a result, there will be an increasing need to
reexamine the differential treatment of federal foreign affairs
powers.
This Article reexamines one example of such differential treat
ment - the purported immunity of the treaty power from federal
ism limitations. The Constitution provides that the President "shall

have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present con
cur."3 Since the adoption of the Constitution, the President has ex

ercised this power to commit the United States to hundreds of
international obligations. The President also has committed the

United States to thousands of additional obligations without going
through the Article II process, by means of so-called "executive
agreements."4

The treaties entered into by the President are

deemed by the Constitution to be part of the supreme law of the
land,5 and the Supreme Court has construed this supremacy to ex1. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
2. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, PoLmCAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL .ANSWERS: DoES THE
RuLE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 8-9 (1992); Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future
in the Global Village, 47 VAND L. REv. 1441, 1442 (1994); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts,
Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 1617, 1670-77, 1714-15 (1997).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. See Lours HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 215
(2d ed. 1996) (noting that "[s]ince our national beginnings Presidents have made some 1600
treaties with the consent of the Senate" and that Presidents "have made many thousands of
other international agreements without seeking Senate consent"). For a recent list of the
many treaties and executive agreements to which the United States is currently a party, see
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL AovrsoR, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 8732, TREATIES IN FoRCE:
A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
FORCE ON JAN. 1, 1997 (1997).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . ."). The Supreme
.
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tend to executive agreements as well.6 This means, among other
things, that treaties and executive agreements preempt inconsistent
state law.7 Because of the supremacy of treaty law over state law,
the treaty power implicates important issues concerning this coun
try's federal system of government.
A central principle underlying American federalism, often re
cited by the Supreme Court, is that the national government is one
of limited, enumerated powers.8 A corollary of this principle is that
when the federal government makes supreme federal law, it is re
strained in what it can do either by inherent limits in the scope of its
delegated powers, or by the Tenth Amendment's reservation of
powers to the states, or both.9 To be sure, these restraints are not
nearly as strong as they once were, and the Supreme Court's will
ingness to police these restraints has varied throughout U.S. his
tory.10 Nevertheless, neither the Court nor most commentators
deny the

existence

of such restraints. Even in the

Garcia

decision,

the low point of judicial protection of federalism, the Court ac
knowledged that there are "limitation[s] on federal authority inher
ent in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers" and that
Court has held that this supremacy applies only to treaties that are "self-executing." See, e.g.,
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314
(1829). See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties,
89 AM. J. INTI.. L. 695 (1995) (discussing the self-execution requirement). The automatic
supremacy of some treaties in the U.S. system distinguishes this country from many other
countries, such as Great Britain, where treaties become domestic law only after they are
implemented by the legislature. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC lNTERNA·
TIONAL LAW 47-48 (4th ed. 1990) (describing the practice in Great Britain).
6. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
7. For an early confirmation of the supremacy of treaties over state law, see Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796) (Chase, J.). The other principal form of interna·
tional law - customary international law - is not mentioned in the Supremacy Clause, and
its domestic-law status is less certain. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique ofthe Modem Position, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 815 (1997) (questioning the proposition that customary international law has the
status of federal common law).
8. For recent statements by the Court to this effect, see, for example, City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); and
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). For earlier statements, see cases cited infra
note 162.
9. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 {1992). When I refer to the Tenth
Amendment, I am referring, like the modern Supreme Court, to "any implied constitutional
limitation on [the federal government's] authority to regulate state activities, whether
grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in principles of federalism derived generally
from the Constitution." South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 n.5 {1988); see also Printz
v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2379 n.13 (1997) ("Our system of dual sovereignty is re
flected in numerous constitutional provisions . . . and not only those, like the Tenth Amend
ment, that speak to the point explicitly.") (citation omitted).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 41-52, 263-65.
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"[t]he States unquestionably do 'retai[n] a significant measure of
sovereign authority.' "11
This is not the conventional wisdom, however, with respect to
the treaty power. Although the treaty power is understood as being
subject to the individual rights protections of the Constitution,12
and perhaps also to separation of powers restrictions,13 treaties and
executive agreements are not thought to be limited either by subject
matter or by the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the
states. As Professor Lori Damrosch has stated, "our constitutional
law is clear: the treaty-makers may make supreme law binding on
the states as to any subject, and notions of states' rights should not
be asserted as impediments to the full implementation of treaty ob
ligations."14 For the sake of convenience, I will refer to this conven
tional wisdom as the "nationalist view." The nationalist view has
been endorsed by a number of prominent foreign affairs commenta
tors,15 as well as by the influential Restatement (Third) of the For
eign Relations Law of the United States.16
As suggested by Professor Damrosch, the nationalist view of the
treaty power has two components. First, largely on _the basis of the
Supreme Court's decision in

Missouri

v.

Holland,17

it generally is

understood today that "the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the
several States the powers not delegated to the United States, does
11. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1985) (quoting
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting)); see also Garcia, 469
U.S. at 547 ("What has proved problematic is not the perception that the Constitution's fed
eral structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and con
tent of those limitations.").
12. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1957)
(plurality opinion).
13. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 4, at 195. Some commentators contend, for example,
that an international agreement cannot be self-executing if it "would achieve what lies within
the exclusive law-making power of Congress under the Constitution." See REsTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 111 cmt. i (1987) [here
inafter REsTATEMENT (T HIRD)]; but cf. REsT.li.TEMENT (THIRD), supra reporters' note 6 (not
ing that "[t]here is no definitive authority" for such a rule). Some commentators also suggest
that the treaty power is subject to the prohibitions in Article I, Section 9, such as the prohibi
tion on granting titles of nobility. See REsTATEMENT (T HIRD), supra § 302 cmt. b.
14. Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self
Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 515, 530 (1991).
15. In addition to Professor Damrosch, see, for example, HENKIN, supra note 4, at 191,
197; Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 33, 34,
46-47 (1997).
16. See REsTATEMENT (T HIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmts. c-d; REsTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 13, § 302 reporters' notes 2-3; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 303 cmt. b.
17. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In Holland, the Court upheld a migratory bird protection statute
a valid implementation of a treaty with Great Britain, notwithstanding the argument
(plausible at the time) that the statute exceeded Congress's domestic lawmaking powers. For
a discussion of Holland, see infra text accompanying notes 185-94.

as
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not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements. "18 Sec
ond, while it "was once widely accepted" that treaties could be
made only with respect to matters of "international concern,"19
most commentators today either disagree with such a limitation or
assume that it is insignificant, given that most matters upon which
treaties are likely to be concluded can plausibly be characterized as
of international concern.20
In this Article, I question the nationalist view. As I explain, the
two components of the nationalist view have developed in isolation.
While either component might seem relatively unproblematic by it
self, when considered together they violate the principle of limited,
enumerated powers. The treaty power in our Constitution is a
power to make supreme federal law. If such law can be made on
any subject, without regard to the rights of the states, then the
treaty power gives the federal government essentially plenary
power vis-a-vis the states. Such plenary power, however, is exactly
what American federalism denies. This inconsistency between the
nationalist view and American federalism is particularly significant
today, in light of the Supreme Court's renewed commitment to pro
tecting federalism and the rapidly expanding nature of this coun
try's treaty commitments.21
I should make clear at the outset the nature of my argument. I
am not defending here the value of federalism, or judicial review of
federalism, subjects that have generated enormous literature.22 My
argument is simply that if federalism is to be the subject of judicial
protection - as the current Supreme Court appears to believe there is no justification for giving the treaty power special immunity
from such protection. My argument is one against treaty power ex
ceptionalism, not necessarily one in favor of federalism. In addi
tion, I am not assuming here the legitimacy of any particular
method of constitutional interpretation, such as originalism or tex
tualism. Instead, I consider all the standard interpretive materials,
including text, history, structure, and changed circumstances, and I
18. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmt. d.
19. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 197.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 247-55.
21. See infra Part I.
22. For a recent survey of arguments for and against federalism, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating
the Founders' Design, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1484 (1987) (book review). For a useful discussion
of various models of federalism protection, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces ofFeder
alism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563 (1994).
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conclude that none of these materials justifies giving the treaty
power special immunity from federalism limitations.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes why the re
lationship between the treaty power and American federalism is
particularly significant today, in light of recent changes in the na
ture of treaty-making, as well as the recent federalism jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court. Part II examines materials from the Found
ing period and the nineteenth century and concludes that, contrary
to claims by its proponents, the nationalist view lacks substantial
support in history. Part ID recounts how the nationalist view be
came orthodoxy, beginning with the Supreme Court's 1920 decision
in Holland and followed by the eventual academic repudiation of a
subject matter limitation on the treaty power. Part IV then sets
forth a critique of the nationalist view. In particular, it questions
the three principal justifications for the nationalist_view: that the
treaty power is immune from federalism restrictions because that
power has been exclusively delegated to the federal government;
that federalism limitations are unnecessary because the political
process is sufficient to protect states' rights; and that imposing fed
eralism limitations on the treaty power would unduly interfere with
the ability of the federal government to speak with one voice in
foreign affairs. Part V argues that, while it may not be feasible to
limit the treaty power by subject matter, this power should at least
be subject to the same federalism limitations as Congress's legisla
tive powers. To the extent that this conclusion would require over
ruling Holland, this Part argues that the justifications for stare
decisis are weak in this context, given the substantial changes in
both the nature of treaty-making and the scope of permissible fed
eral legislation.
I.

CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FEDERALISM lssUE
The relationship between the treaty power and American feder

alism is not a new issue. It has been a matter of controversy since
the Founding of the Constitution. It also was the subject of sub
stantial academic and official attention during both the early part of
this century and the 1950s.23 During the last several decades, how
ever, it seems largely to have receded from view. I n this Part, I
explain why this issue is likely to come back into focus, and why it
deserves our attention.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 177-81, 210-13.
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Changes in Treaty-Making

To those unfamiliar with international law, it might seem that
the treaty power would be an unlikely threat to federalism. Trea
ties, after all, conce!Jl the relations among nations, whereas federal
ism concerns the relationship between the national government and
the constituent states. To put it differently, treaties concern
national

relations

whereas

federalism

concerns

inter

intra-national

relations.
This dichotomy might have been accurate at one time in Ameri
can history, when treaties were generally bilateral and regulated
matters such as diplomatic immunity, military neutrality, and re
moval of trade barriers.24 The nature of treaty-making, however,
has undergone a radical transformation, especially in the years since
World War II. As the Restatement

(Third) of Foreign Relations Law

explains, "[u]ntil recently, international law was essentially custom

ary law: agreements made particular arrangements between partic
ular parties, but were not ordinarily used for general law-making
for states."25 During the latter part of this century, however, there
has been a proliferation of treaties, such that treaty-making has
now eclipsed custom as the primary mode of international law
making.26 Moreover, many of these treaties take the form of de
tailed multilateral instruments negotiated and drafted at interna
tional conferences. These treaties resemble and are designed to
operate as international "legislation" binding on much of the
world.27
Even more significant than these structural changes is the
change in the content of modern treaty-making. While many trea
ties continue to concern matters traditionally viewed as inter-na
tional in nature, numerous others concern matters that in the past
countries would have addressed wholly domestically. This change
in treaty-making is most evident in the area of international human
rights law, which purports to regulate the relationship between na
tions and their own citizens. There is now general agreement "that
how a state treats individual human beings, including its own citi
zens, in respect of their human rights, is not the state's own business
24. See generally RALsroN HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES 1789-1817 (1920);
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, chs. v, VI (1947).

ARTiiUR NUSSBAUM,

25.

REsrATEMENT

(THIRD), supra note 13, pt. I, introductory note, at 18.

26. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, pt. I, introductory note, at 18; see also
REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, pt. III, introductory note, at 144.
27. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, pt. III, introductory note, at 144; HENKIN,
supra note 4, at 176; Loms HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PoLmcs AND VALUES 42 (1995).
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alone . . . but is a matter of international concern and a proper
subject for regulation by international law."28 As a result, there are
today a host of multilateral human rights treaties that purport to
confer a variety of rights that individuals can assert against their
own governments. These treaties address issues such as racial and
gender equality, criminal procedure and punishment, and religious
freedom.29
Tb.is transformation in treaty-making is so fundamental that it
alters the very essence of international commitments. As Professor
Henkin has explained, "[h]uman rights law has shaken the sources
of international law, reshaped its character, enlarged its domain."30
Because treaties now regulate matters that countries traditionally
have considered internal, there is an increasing likelihood of over
lap, and conflict, with domestic law. Tb.is is particularly so, given
that "in certain important respects, international human rights
norms are more rights-protective than the corresponding domestic
law standards."31 In a federalist system like the United States, this
means that some of the overlap and conflict is likely to occur at the
state level.

28. REsTATEMENT

(THIRD), supra note 13, pt. VII, introductory note, at 144-45.

29. The most prominent human rights treaties include the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 l.L.M. 1448 [hereinafter CRq; the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb.
4, 1985, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; the Convention on the Elimi
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, S. Exec. Rep. No. 103-38 (1994), 1249
U.N.T.S. 13, [hereinafter CEDAW]; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEc.
Doc. D, 95-2, (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2,
(1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. For a discussion of these
and other human rights treaties, see generally RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST liANNuM, IN
TERNATIONAL HUMAN Rimrrs: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1995).
,

30. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INTL. & CoMP. L. 31,
36 (1995-96); see also John P. Humphrey, The Revolution in the Law of Human Rights, 4
HUM. RTS. 205, 208 (1975) (describing this change as the most "radical development in the
whole history of international law"). For discussions of how this new international law devel
oped, see Louis Henkin, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF Rimrrs: THE COVE
NANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1-31 (1981); and Louis B. Sohn, The New
International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L.
REv. 1 (1982).
31. Nadine Strossen, United States Ratification of the International Bill of Rights: A Fit
ting Celebration of the Bicentennial of the U.S. Bill of Rights, 24 U. ToL. L. REv. 203, 204
(1992); see also Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L.
REv. 567, 567 (1997) ("The human rights movement is now turning its attention to conditions
in the United States, and it is increasingly finding instances in which such practices fall short
of international standards.").
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Another important development during this period has been the
increasing use by the President of executive agreements. Executive
agreements are, quite simply, international agreements concluded
by the President without the two-thirds senatorial advice and con
sent specified in Article II of the Constitution.32 Executive agree
ments approved in advance or after the fact by a majority of both
houses of Congress are referred to as "congressional-executive
agreements."33 Executive agreements concluded by the President
alone are referred to as "sole executive agreements."34 The
Supreme Court has endorsed the constitutional legitimacy of execu
tive agreements,35 and it has held that even sole executive agree
ments are supreme federal law and thus supersede inconsistent
state law.36 The Court has not addressed the permissible scope of
executive agreements, but the prevailing view today is that at least
congressional-executive agreements are fully interchangeable with
treaties and thus may be used any time that a treaty would be
proper.37
While executive agreements were relatively infrequent during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the vast majority of
international agreements concluded by the President in the latter
half of this century have been in the form of executive agreements
rather than Article II treaties.38 Commentators have debated at
various times the constitutional legitimacy of such agreements,39
32. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 303 cmt. a.
33. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 303 cmt. e.
34. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 303 cmt. g.
35. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675-88 {1981) (upholding sole exec·
utive agreement suspending state-law-based claims against Iran); United States v. Curtiss
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 {1936) (including in the list of the President's
unenumerated powers "the power to make such international agreements as do not consti
tute treaties in the constitutional sense").
36. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 {1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 331 {1937).
37. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 303 cmt. e; HENKIN, supra note 4, at 217,
229; Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, ls NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. RBv. 799,
805 {1995); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmt. d ("[T]he Tenth
Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated to the United States,
does not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements.") (emphasis added). But see
Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements,
86 CAL. L. RBv. 671 (1998) (questioning the interchangeability of treaties and executive
agreements). There is less agreement concerning the proper scope of sole executive agree·
ments. See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 222.
38. See BARRY E. CARTER & PffiLLIP R. T RIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 {2d ed.
1995); LoCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 13 {1986);
LAWRENCE MARGOLIS, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL PO WER IN FOREIGN
POLICY 30-31, 105-06 (1985).
39. For a debate during the 1940s, see Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement
Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE LJ. 664 (1944); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and
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but the issue may be largely academic in light of the widespread and
now longstanding nature of the practice and Congress's acqui
escence to it. The rise of executive agreements is relevant to the
federalism question because the two-thirds Senate consent require
ment in Article II, which these agreements bypass, has long been
thought to provide special protection of states' rights.40
B.

Supreme Court's Renewed Commitment to Federalism

As the above changes in treaty-making began to unfold after
World War II, concerns were in fact raised regarding their potential
impact on American federalism. These concerns were expressed
most prominently in connection with debates in the 1950s over the
proposed "Bricker Amendment" to the Constitution.41 This con
troversy died out, however, in part because of the Supreme Court's
expanded reading of Congress's commerce and other powers, be
ginning in the New Deal era and continuing into the civil rights
era.42 Once it became understood that the federal government had
almost unlimited domestic lawmaking powers, the particular scope
of the treaty power (or executive agreement power) became less
relevant.43 Although the Supreme Court did attempt to reinvigo
rate the Tenth Amendment in its 1976 National League decision,44
this effort was short-lived, as a majority of the Court overruled that
decision just nine years later in the Garcia case.45 Thus, once again,
the Court seemed to allow the federal government essentially un
limited lawmaking power vis-a-vis the states.46
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments ofNational
Policy (pts. 1 & 2), 54 YALE LJ. 181, 534 (1945); Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive
Agreements -A Reply, 54 YALE LJ. 616 (1945). For a more recent debate, see Ackerman
& Golove, supra note 37, and Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflec
tions on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1223 (1995).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 118-22, 288-89.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 210-16.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-17 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58
(1964); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651-58 (1966); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 438-44 (1968); see also Ackerman & Golove, supra note 37, at 857 (noting this
point).
43. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227 (2d ed. 1988);
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 37, at 857, 898; Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the
Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. RE.v. 903, 905
(1959).
44. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
45. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
46. Cf. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1485, 1487 (1994)
(noting that Garcia made explicit what was implicit in the New Deal cases); John C. Yoo, The
Judicial Safeguards ofFederalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311, 1311 (1997) (stating that "it was in
Garcia that the Court announced that it no longer would examine the constitutionality of
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During the 1990s, however, the Court has shown a willingness in
a number of areas to limit the scope of Congress's domestic powers,
and to enforce the rights of the states against federal regulation.
For example, in New York v. United States, the Court invalidated a
federal statute that in effect compelled state disposal of radioactive
waste as "inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government
established by the Constitution";47 in United States v. Lopez, the
Court invalidated a federal statute criminalizing the possession of
:firearms near school zones as exceeding Congress's powers under
the Commerce Clause;48 in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court in
validated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)49 on the
ground that it exceeded Congress's powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment;50 and in Printz v. United States, the Court invalidated
a federal statute requiring state law enforcement officials to con
duct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers as
"compromis[ing] the structural framework of dual sovereignty."51
The recent Court also has protected federalism in other, less direct
ways - for example, by narrowing the situations in which Congress
can override the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit.52
The Supreme Court's renewed commitment to protecting feder
alism is likely to increase the importance of the scope of the treaty
power. If the treaty power is immune from federalism restrictions,
as the nationalist view maintains, then it may be a vehicle for the
enactment of legislative changes that fall outside of Congress's do
mestic lawmaking powers.53 Indeed, commentators recently have
begun to seize on this possibility.
federal legislation that threatened to violate the sovereignty of the states"). For additional
discu5sion of Garcia and its reasoning, see infra text accompanying notes 292-93.
47. 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992).
48. See 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 {1995).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 {1994). The statute disallowed federal or state regula
tions that substantially burdened the exercise of religion, absent a compelling government
interest, and even then only if the least restrictive means were used. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1.
50. See 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 {1997). In light of Lopez, RFRA presumably could not be
justified as an exercise of Congress's commerce powers. See Neuman, supra note 15, at 34;
William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure ofthe Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DuKE L.J. 291, 303 n.33 (1996).
51. 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 {1997).
52. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 {1996) {holding that the
Commerce Clause cf.oes not give Congress the power to override Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
53. It is well settled that Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, has the power
to implement valid treaties. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432, 435 (1920);
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901); United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 82 {2d Cir.
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Professor Gerald Neuman, for example, has argued that even if
is not a valid exercise of Congress's domestic lawmaking
powers, it can be justified constitutionally as part of this country's
implementation of a treaty - the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR).54 The ICCPR, which the United
States ratified in 1992, contains a long list of individual rights that
cannot be infringed by member countries. One of these rights is a
right "to freedom of thought, conscience and religion," which the
Convention says includes a right "to manifest [one's] religion or be
lief in worship, observance, practice and teaching."55 The Conven
tion also says that the only limitations that may be imposed on this
right are those "necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."56
Neuman makes the plausible argument that these provisions au
thorize Congress to grant religious freedom protection such as is
reflected in the RFRA statute.57 As for the federalism concerns
associated with the statute, Neuman argues that "[t]he mere fact
that the treaty may require the extension of religious exemptions
within areas of traditional state regulation creates no obstacle to its
validity" in light of the well-settled proposition that the treaty
power is "free from any 'invisible radiation from the general terms
of the Tenth Amendment.' "58 In other words, even though the
Supreme Court has declared the RFRA statute to be "a considera
ble congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives
and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their
citizens,"59 this intrusion is entirely proper, says Neuman, as long as
it is enacted pursuant to a treaty. This is what the nationalist view
entails, and Neuman has only scratched the surface.
RFRA

1998); REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 111 cmt. j; see also U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl.
18 (giving Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof').
54. See Neuman, supra note 15, at 49-53.
55. ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 18(1).
56. Id. art. 18(3).
57. But see Daniel O. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v.
Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local
Infringement, 20 U. Aru<:. LITTLE RoCK L.J. 633, 662 (1998) (arguing that "anything close to a
verbatim reenactment of RFRA would appear to go well beyond what [the ICCPR]
requires").
58. Neuman, supra note 15, at 46 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)).
59. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997).
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Other Examples

The RFRA example is just one of many instances in which the
treaty power might be used to overcome federalism restraints on
domestic lawmaking. Below I consider a number of other exam
ples, some actual and some speculative, where this issue might
arise.

1. Human Rights Standards
There are numerous instances in which Congress might use
human rights treaties to overcome federalism restraints on its law
making power. Consider, for example, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child,6° which became effective in 1990 and has now
been ratified by almost every nation in the world. This treaty which the United States has signed but has not yet ratified - con
tains a number of provisions that may be inconsistent with current
U.S. family law.61 This inconsistency has prompted federalism con
cems62 because family law is a subject that largely has been regu
lated in this country at the state rather than federal level.63
60. CRC, supra note 29.
61. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 36-37;
see also CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMEruCA: U.N. CONVENTION ON nm RIGHTS OF nm CHILD
COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds.,
1990) (discussing various aspects of the Convention). The Convention purports to give chil
dren both certain procedural rights as well as substantive rights concerning such things as
expression, belief, association, privacy, education, and even a certain standard of living. See
CRC, supra note 29, arts. 12-27.
62. See, e.g., Richard E. Crouch, International Declaration/Convention Efforts and the
Current Status of Children's Rights in the United States, in THE FAMILY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw: SoME EMERGING PROBLEMS 19, 19-21 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981) (noting the poten
tially large inipact the Convention could have on American federalism); Susan Kilbourne,
U.S. Failure to Ratify the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: Playing Politics with
Children's Rights, 6 TRANSNATL. L. & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 437, 440-56 (1996) (discussing vari
ous criticisms of the Convention, including those based on federalism); James J. Kilpatrick,
Treaty on Children Adds Up to Bad Law, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 18, 1991, at 21A
(criticizing the Convention as creating "the prospect of one massive federal code on the care
and feeding of children"). For a discussion of other ways in which family law is increasingly
becoming the subject of international agreements, see Adair Dyer, The Internationalization
of Family Law, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 625 (1997).
63. See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) ('"The whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States."') (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94
(1890)). See generally Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787,
1821-25 (1995) (explaining this point). This is not to say that family law is completely a
matter of state law in this country. Indeed, in recent years, family law has come to be "very
substantially affected by federal constitutional doctrine, by federal statutes and by private law
decisions of the federal courts." HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & CAROL GLO WINSKY, CASES AND
PROBLEMS ON DoMESTJc RELATIONS 2 (4th ed. 1990); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism
and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1297, 1298 (1998) (challenging "the exist
ence of an exclusively local tradition in family law").
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Similar concerns have been raised with respect to the Conven
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW),64 various sections of which "provide for the
elimination of discrimination against women in areas of govern
ment that have historically been considered political functions of
the several states, such as regulation of family relations and educa
tion." 65 The Convention includes provisions addressing, among
other things, discrimination "in recreational activities, sports and all
aspects of cultural life," as well as "in all matters relating to mar
riage and family relations."66 The United States has signed but has
not yet ratified this Convention, although the Clinton administra
tion has been pressing the Senate for approval.67
Still another example is the relationship between international
law and the controversial issue of affirmative action. Some states,
such as California, have begun to cut back on race-based and other
affirmative action programs.68 In response, two scholars recently
made the claim that such affirmative action, even if no longer re
quired as a matter of U.S. domestic law, may be mandated by
human rights treaties to which the United States is a party.69

2. Criminal Law and Punishment
American criminal law, another area of law primarily regulated
in this country at the state level, also has become the subject of
treaty-making. For example, the statute implementing the Geno
cide Convention makes it a federal crime to kill or cause serious
64. CEDAW, supra note 29.
65. Julia Ernst, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & LAW 299, 320 (1995); see also Malvina
Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEo. WASH. J. INn.. L. & EcoN. 49 (1997) (discussing
proposed U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations regarding the Convention, in
cluding proposed federalism understanding); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the Pro

posed United States Reservations to CEDAW: Should the Constitution be an Obstacle to
Human Rights?, 23 HAsnNos CoNST. L.Q. 727 (1996) (describing federalism and other con
cerns that have been raised regarding the Convention).

66. CEDAW, supra note 29, arts. 13, 16.
67. See, e.g., Ann Scales, Hillary Clinton, Madeleine Albright Push for Women's Pact
Approva� BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1998, at AS.
68. See California Civil Rights Initiative, CAL. CoNST. art. 1, § 31(a) (1996) ("The state
shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employ
ment, public education, or public contracting.").

69. See Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help
Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 423 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, Race-Based Affirmative Action
and International Law, 18 MICH. J. INn.. L. 659, 674 (1997); see also Editorial, U.N. Conven
tion Ties U.S. to Affirmative Action, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER, Oct. 17, 1997, at 32
(arguing that treaties require racial and gender affirmative action).
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bodily harm in this country "with the specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group as such."70 A similar example is the recently-enacted statute
implementing the Hostage Convention, which federalizes garden
variety kidnappings in this country whenever a foreign citizen is in
volved.71 It is possible that statutes such as these raise federalism
concerns, given that, "[u]nder our federal system, the 'States pos
sess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law.'"72
Criminal punishment, especially the death penalty, presents an
additional area of potential conflict between treaty law and federal
ism. Despite international criticism,73 the United States is imposing
the death penalty with increasing regularity, primarily at the state
level. In light of recent Supreme Court precedent, it seems unlikely
that the federal government has the power under either Article I or
the Fourteenth Amendment to abolish state use of the death pen
alty, assuming states are not imposing it in a manner that violates
the Eighth Amendment.74 According to the nationalist view, how
ever, this limitation on the federal government's power would dis
appear if the federal government entered into a treaty outlawing
capital punishment.75
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (1994); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995)
(noting that the statute applies to private conduct "if the crime is committed within the
United States or by a U.S. national").
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994). For a recent decision rejecting federalism challenges to
this statute, see United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Lin,
101 F.3d 760, 765-66 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying the statute even though the defendant's "ac
tions took place entirely in the District of Columbia, did not constitute international acts of
hostage-taking .. . did not involve the United States government" and "could as well have
supported charges under local District of Columbia law"); United States v. Lopez-Flores, 63
F.3d 1468, 1470 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that "the statute is constitutional as an exercise of
Congress' plenary powers over aliens and foreign relations"). For a discussion of the Lue
case, see infra text accompanying notes 362-67.
72. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (quotation marks
omitted))).
73. See, e.g., David Stout, Do as We Say, Not as We Do: U.S. Executions Draw Scorn from
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998, § 4 at 4 (describing some of this criticism); Elizabeth
Olson, U.N. Report Criticizes U.S. for 'Racist' Use ofDeath Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998,
at Al7 (same).
74. See Spiro, supra note 31, at 576 n.28.
75. There is no such treaty, and the likelihood of the United States ratifying such a treaty
is probably small. Some specific applications of the death penalty, however, are already the
subject of treaty. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United
States has ratified, see supra text accompanying notes 54-56, provides, among other things,
that the "(s]entence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women." ICCPR, supra note
29, art. 6(5). In consenting to the treaty, the Senate stated that, "subject to its Constitutional
constraints," the United States reserves the right "to impose capital punishment on any per-
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Although involving a more traditional treaty, a recent incident
dramatically illustrates the potential conflict between the treaty
power and state authority to impose the death penalty. In April
1998, the International Court of Justice in The Hague (the "ICJ")
ordered the United States to "take all measures at its disposal" to
stay the execution in Virginia of Angel Breard, a Paraguayan na
tional, while the Court considered a suit brought against the United
States by Paraguay.76 The suit alleged that Virginia had violated a
multilateral treaty, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,77
by failing to advise Breard of his right to contact and request assist
ance from the Paraguayan consulate, and that, as a result, Breard's
conviction and sentence should be vacated.78
In response to the ICJ's order, the State Department asked
Virginia's governor voluntarily to stay the execution, but he refused
to do so, stating that delaying the execution "would have the practi
cal effect of transferring responsibility from the courts of the Com
monwealth [of Virginia] and the United States to the International
Court."79 The U.S. Supreme Court also refused to stay the execu
tion, concluding that "[i]f the Governor wishes to wait for the deci
sion of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But nothing in our existing
case law allows us to make that choice for him. "80 The Justice Department, in a brief submitted to the Supreme Court, stated that
even if the ICJ's order were binding, the federal government did
not have the power to compel Virginia's compliance with it because
"our federal system imposes limits on the federal government's
ability to interfere with the criminal justice systems of the States. "81
son (other than a pregnant woman) . . . including such punishment for crimes committed by
persons below eighteen years of age." 138 CoNG. REc. 8070 (Apr. 2, 1992) (U.S. Senate
resolution advising and consenting to ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights). Cf. Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States
Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights
Conformity Act of1993, 42 DEPAUL L. RE:v. 1209, 1213 n.24 (1993) (noting that "federalism
concerns would prove no bar to the preemption of state law" by these provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
76. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
37 I.L.M. 810, 819 (Apr. 9, 1998) (order granting request for indication of provisional
measures).
77. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261.
78. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
37 I.L.M. 810, 814 (Apr. 9, 1998) (order granting request for indication of provisional
measures).
79. Co=onwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Press Office, Statement by Gov
ernor Jim Gilmore Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard (Apr. 14, 1998).
80. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1356 (1998).
81. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352
(1998) (No. 97-1390).
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A number of commentators, by contrast, have argued that, in light
of Holland, such federalism limits were not applicable.82

3.

Commerce and Trade

Commercial and other private law treaties also have the poten
tial to intrude on traditional state prerogatives. As one commenta
tor recently explained, "[a]t issue in the ratification process . . . is
nothing less than federal arrogation of traditional state competence
in the law governing private, and in particular commercial, rela
tions."83 The United States already is a party to the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.84 This Convention
governs the sale of goods in a variety of international contract situa
tions, although contracting parties are allowed to opt out of its pro
visions.85 In this country, the Convention is considered a self
executing treaty, and thus, when it applies, it preempts inconsistent
state law, including the Uniform Commercial Code.86
Another sector of private law that may become the subject of a
treaty is the enforcement of judgments. A number of countries, in
cluding the United States, currently are negotiating a proposed
multilateral treaty, in connection with The Hague Conference on
Private International Law, that would establish uniform standards
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 87 This is
a subject that has been regulated in this country primarily by the
states,88 and commentators expressed concern as late as the 1950s
that a treaty on this subject might exceed federal power.89 A simi82. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States,
92 AM. J. INTL. L. 679 (1998); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to
Require Compliance with [CJ Orders ofProvisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INTL. L. 683 (1998).
83. Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic
Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 690
.
(1998).
84. See United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter Conference on Con·
tracts']. The United States became a party to this treaty in 1988.
85. See Conference on Contracts', supra note 84, at 671.
86. See, e.g., Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1995);
Ftlanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Intl. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dis·
missed, 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993).
87. See generally Symposium, Could a Treaty Trump Supreme Court Jurisdictional Doc
trine?, 61 ALBANY L. REv. 1159-1307 (1998) (discussing proposed multilateral convention
governing jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments); Symposium, Enforcing Judgments'
Abroad: The Global Challenge, 24 BROOKLYN J. INTL L. 1-220 (1998) (same).
88. See GARY B. BoRN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LmGATION IN UNITED STATES CouRTS
938-39 (3d ed. 1996).
89. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests': The Federal Government and Inter·
national Efforts' to Unify Rules ofPrivate Law, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 323, 359-60 (1954); see also
Charles Evans Hughes, The Outlook for Pan Americanism - Some Observations on the Sixth
International Conference of American States, 22 PROC. AM. SoCY. INTL L. 1, 12 (1928) (ex.

.
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lar example is the Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession
to the Estates of Deceased Persons,90 which would establish choice
of law rules concerning inheritance issues. This "Convention would
seem to change hallowed rules of U.S. state law without the scru
tiny that such a change would get in a state legislature."91

An

additional example in commercial law is the protection of

intellectual property, a subject increasingly regulated by treaty.92
Intellectual property protection is governed extensively in this
country by federal law, but there are recognized limits to the scope
of permissible federal protection.93 This has prompted one com
mentator recently to wonder whether, in light of Holland, the fed
eral government could by treaty confer stronger intellectual
property rights than it would otherwise have the power to do pursu
ant to its domestic lawmaking powers.94
Federalism concerns also exist with respect to the GATI and
NAFfA trade agreements, which were concluded by the President
by means of executive agreements rather than the Article II treaty
process.95 Both of these agreements contain provisions that affect
pressing doubts regarding the ability of the United States to enter into a treaty concerning
private international law). But cf. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 471-72 n.87 ("Today, few would
accept - on any theory - the conclusion . . . that the United States could not adhere to a
convention establishing uniform principles of private international law.").
90. Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons,
Aug. 1, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 150.
91. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 38, at 175; see also Jeffrey Schoenblum, Choice of
Law and Succession to Wealth: A Critical Analysis of the Ramifications ofthe Hague Conven
tion on Succession to Decedent's Estates, 32 V A. J. lNn.. L. 82 (1991) (discussing and criticiz
ing the Convention).
92. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 V A. J. lNn.. L. 505, 546-49 (1997) (discussing some of the treaties in this area).
93. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
(holding that, under the Copyright Clause, Congress has the power to confer copyright pro
tection only on original works).
94. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 V A. J. lNn.. L. 369, 422
n.302 (1997); see also Lawrence Lessig & Pamela Samuelson, In Defiance of the Public
Interest, WASH. PoST, July 13, 1998, at A21 (arguing that proposed implementing legislation
for a recent intellectual property treaty "would throw this constitutional balance [between
the need for encouraging creativity and the public interest in having access to knowledge and
innovation] out of kilter"); cf. Michael B. Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally
Mandated Originality as a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 Aruz. ST. L.J.
1461, 1465-68 (1992) (relying on Holland by analogy to argue that Congress can enact copy
right legislation pursuant to its commerce powers that it could not enact pursuant to its Copy
right Clause powers).
95. See generally George A. Bermann, Constitutional Implications of U.S. Participation in
Regional Integration, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 463, 466-67 (1998); Friedman, supra note 2, at 145360; David W. Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the United States, in
IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY RoUND 175 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997);
Samuel C. Straight, Note, GAIT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the
Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DuKE L.J. 216 (1995).
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state regulatory authority.96 Objections were made to the latest
GATI agreement, for example, on the ground that it "impinged on
matters that had been, and are generally, governed by state law,
such as product-safety regulation, banking and insurance, and local
'tax breaks' and other subsidy practices." 97 Similarly, one commen
tator recently noted that the agreement may override state voter
initiatives concerning the labeling of products.98

4.

Environmental Protection

The potential conflict between the treaty power and federalism
is also evident in the area of environmental protection. The United
States is a party to a number of treaties relating to the environment,
some of which Congress has invoked or could invoke as a basis for
its enactment of federal environmental legislation. In enacting the
Endangered Species Act,99 for example, Congress cited as a basis
for its authority various treaties including the Convention on Na
ture Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemi
sphere.100 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States

v. Lopez,

it is arguable that some of these statutes, or at least cer

tain applications of them, exceed Congress's powers under the com
merce clause.101 If so, the constitutionality of these statutes may
depend on the validity of the nationalist view of the treaty power.102
96. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1454·60.
97. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 168; see also William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty?: The
Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INTI.. L.J. 427, 469 (1995)
(noting that "[t]he implications of [the latest GAIT agreement] on state law are significant");
Friedman, supra note 2, at 1454 ("In sharp contrast to prior negotiations, the Uruguay Round
of the GAIT adopted rules in many areas that will affect state regulatory authority.").
98. See James T. O'Reilly, Stop the World, We Want Our Own Labels: Treaties, State
Voter Initiative Laws, and Federal Pre-emption, 18 U. PA. J. INTL. EcoN. L. 617 (1997). The
NAFrA and GAIT implementing statutes do take account of federalism concerns to some
extent, in that they provide for a federal-state consultation process and allow only the federal
government to challenge a state law as being in violation of the agreements. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 3312 {1994) {NAFrA); 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994) (GAIT).
99. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1531-44 (1994)).
100. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a); S. REP. No. 93-307 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2989, 2994. Another example is the statute at issue in Holland - the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act - which implements the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds. See infra
text accompanying notes 187-88.
101. To date, however, courts generally have rejected commerce clause challenges to fed
eral environmental statutes. See, e.g., National Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding provision in Endangered Species Act); United States
v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding application of the Comprehen
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act); United States v. Bramble,
103 F.3d 1475, 1480-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding Eagle Protection Act).
102. See generally Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and
Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76
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Commandeering of State Governments

Finally, consider the "commandeering" regulations invalidated
by the Supreme Court in New York v. United States103 and Printz v.
United States.104 It is not inconceivable that the federal government
would conclude treaties addressing the subject matter of those cases
- disposal of radioactive waste and background checks for hand
gun ownership. Indeed, although not directly on point, the United
States recently signed a treaty that provides that the parties to it
"shall adopt the necessary legislative or other measures to establish
as criminal offenses under their domestic law the illicit manufactur
ing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other
related materials."105 According to the nationalist view, the ratifi
cation of relevant treaties presumably would allow Congress to re
enact the provisions invalidated in New York and Printz,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's determination that they in
truded too deeply on state sovereignty.106
* * *

I do not mean to suggest that any of these examples necessarily
should be viewed as an improper exercise of the treaty power. I
mention them rather because they highlight the increasing tension
between international law and this country's federalist system. In
light of this tension, the relationship between the treaty power and
American federalism merits reexamination.
II.

HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE TREATY POWER

Proponents of the nationalist view of the treaty power some
times rely on history to support their claims. In particular, they ar
gue that the Founders did not intend either a states'-rights or a
subject matter limitation on the treaty power and that the Supreme
Court repeatedly rejected such limitations during the nineteenth
TEXAS L. REv. 1125 (1998) (arguing that the treaty power is currently the strongest source of
authority supporting the constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act).
103. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
104. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
105. Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials, adopted Nov. 14, 1997, art.
IV, para. 1, 37 I.L.M. 143, 146 (1998); see also Raymond Bonner, U.N. Panel May Approve
Limit on Guns Despite N.R.A. Pleas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at A9 (describing a United
Nations proposal to reduce trade in firearms).
106. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 15, at 52; Leebron, supra note 95, at 225 n.193; cf.
Tribe, supra note 39, at 1260. But see HENKIN, supra note 4, at 467 n.75 (assuming, without
explanation, that this could not be done by treaty).
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century.101 In fact, the historical record reveals a fairly consistent
understanding that the treaty power was limited either by subject
matter, states' rights, or both. This historical record may not by
itself require contemporary rejection of the nationalist view, but it
does undermine any strong historical claims for that view.
A.

Founding Period

In the materials relating to the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution, the only substantial discussions of the scope of the
treaty power are contained in the records of the Virginia Ratifying
Convention. Neither the records of the Federal Convention nor the

Federalist Papers

contain much discussion of this issue. Rather, the

references to treaties in these materials primarily concern the pro
cess by which the federal government would conclude treaties and
the proper governmental actors to be involved in this process.108
Thus, for example, there was debate over whether to include the
House of Representatives in the treaty process and over what pro
portion of the Senate should be required to approve a treaty.109
Several general themes do emerge even from these materials,
however, that may be relevant to the scope of the treaty power.
First, the Founders believed that treaties should be difficult to
make. As Professor Henkin explains, "the prevailing mood at the
Convention was that it should not be too easy to make treaties.
Even the 'nationalists' among the Framers neither desired nor ex
pected many treaties."110 Thus, Gouverneur Morris observed that
"[t]he more difficulty in making treaties, the more value will be set
107. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 4, at 189-94.
108. See generally Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles ofSenate and President in the Making
and Abrogation of Treaties - The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Histori
cally Examined, 55 WASH. L. REv. 1, 79-132 {1979); Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional
Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. (n.s.) 233, 241-43
{1984); Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom ofJonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J.
229, 253-68 (1990); see also Shackelford Miller, The Treaty Making Power, 41 AM. L. REv.
527, 529 (1907) ("At no time
did the convention discuss the scope or extent of the power;
it merely considered the question as to where the power should be lodged - who should
exercise it. The same is true as to the 'Federalist'
); L.L. Thompson, State Sovereignty
and the Treaty-Making Power, 11 CAL. L. REv. 242, 250 (1923) ("The members of the Consti
tutional Convention seem to have been concerned primarily with the question of who would
exercise the treaty-making power.").
109. See, e.g., DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 [hereinafter DEBATES],
reprinted in 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 469, 470 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888); Notes of James
Madison (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 39293 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937); Notes of James Madison (Sept. 7, 1787), in 2 RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, at 538; SUPPLEMENT TO MAx FARRAND'S THE
REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 262 (James H. Hutson ed. 1987) [hereinafter SUP·
PLEMENT]; see generally Bestor, supra note 108, at 93, 97-98, 109-10.
110. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 442 n.2.
• . •
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on them," 111 and James Madison noted that it had been too easy to
make treaties under the Articles of Confederation .112 This theme
was echoed in the state ratification debates. During the
Pennsylvania Convention, James Wilson, in commenting on the
likely workload of the Senate, stated that the treaty power "should
be very seldom exercised - . . . it will be but once in a number of
years, that a single treaty will come before the senate."113
Second, the Founders contemplated that treaties would govern
truly inter-national relations. The categories of treaties mentioned
by the Founders concerned issues such as "war, peace, and com
merce."114 Even Alexander Hamilton, who was no great defender
of states' rights, emphasized in The Federalist that treaties are "not
rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements be
tween sovereign and sovereign."115 This understanding was a natu
ral adjunct of the Founders' belief that there was a clear distinction
between domestic and foreign affairs. Indeed, it is this distinction
that helped ensure, in the Founders' minds, that the national gov
ernment's power would be limited and, correspondingly, that states'

rights would be protected.116 As Professor Zechariah Chafee has
explained: "The vital distinction between foreign affairs and do
mestic matters was taken for granted throughout [the drafting of
the Constitution]. Indeed, this distinction was ingrained in their

minds long before they met in Philadelphia ." 117

111. Notes of James Madison (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN
TION, supra note 109, at 393.
112. See Notes of James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787), in 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoN
VENTION, supra note 109, at 548; see also Quincy Wright, The Constitutionality of Treaties, 13
AM. J. hm.. L. 242, 242 (1919) ("The framers of the American Constitution did not antici
pate or desire the conclusion of many treaties.").
113. James Wilson, Summation and Fmal Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON
THE CoNSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETrERS
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 831, 851 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993); accord
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (July 18, 1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 38-39 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905) ("On the subject of treaties, our
system is to have none with any nation, as far as can be avoided.").
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 390 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST, supra, No. 42 (James Madison), at 265 (referring to the "power of making
commercial treaties"); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 109, at 392-93
(references to treaties of alliance).
115. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), at 450-51.
116. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 45 (James Madison), at 292 (stating
that the national government's powers "will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce").
117. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Amending the Constitution to Cripple Treaties, 12 LA. L. REv.
345, 368 (1952).
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Third, the Founders placed substantial emphasis on the role of
the Senate in protecting states' rights.118 Among other things, they
noted that each state was to have equal representation in the
Senate and that the senators would be elected by state legisla
tures.119 Based on this, they reasoned that state interests would be
safeguarded in the treaty process by assigning the treaty power to
the Senate.120 In carrying out its state-protecting role, the Founders
envisioned that the Senate would be actively involved with the
President in the process of negotiating and concluding treaties.121
Indeed, the Founders envisioned that the Senate would act as "a
council-like body in direct and continuous consultation with the
Executive on matters of foreign policy."122
Fourth, supporters of the Constitution repeatedly expressed the
view that the Constitution delegated only limited powers to the na
tional government.

Federalist No. 45

Perhaps most famously, Madison stated in

that " [t]he powers delegated by the proposed

Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite."123

The Federalist proponents of the Constitution

thought this proposition so evident that it precluded the need for a
Bill of Rights.124 There is no evidence that the Founders believed
the treaty power to be exempt from this general proposition.
118. See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 REcoRDs oF THE FEDERAL
note 109, at 392; DEBATES, supra note 109, at 137-38.
119. See, e.g., DEBATES, supra note 109, at 507; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 64
(John Jay), at 395; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 45 (James Madison), at 291; see
generally Rakove, supra note 108, at 257.
120. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 64 (John Jay), at 395; see generally
Solomon Slonim, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 14 CoLuM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 434
(1975) (discussing and documenting this point).
121. See THE DEBATES IN THE CoNVENTION OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, reprinted
in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 109, at 415, 507; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 64
(John Jay), at 392-93; see generally HENKIN, supra note 4, at 177; JACK N. RAKOVE, Orum
NAL MEANINGS 266 (1996); Rakove, supra note 108, at 257.
122. Arthur Bestor, "Advice" from the Very Beginning, "Consent" When the End is
Achieved, 83 AM. J. !NTL. L. 718, 726 (1989); see also HENKIN, supra note 4, at 177 (making
similar point). In response to concerns that the treaty process would be too dominated by the
states, the Founders emphasized that state influence over treaties would be counterbalanced
by the President's role in the treaty process and by the role of the House of Representatives
in implementing and appropriating money for treaties. See John Yoo, Some Notes on the
Framing of the Treaty Clause (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
123. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 45 (James Madison), at 292; see also RAKOVE,
supra note 121, at 242 ("It was crucial to the formulation of the Federalist position that the
objects of national legislation were at once vital but limited - that is, that they embraced the
most important res publica while leaving the mundane affairs that preoccupied most Ameri
cans to the states.").
124. See RAKoVE, supra note 121, ch. X; CHARLES PINCKNEY, SPEECH IN SoUTII CARO·
LINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1788), reprinted in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON·
VENTION, supra note 109, at 256; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 84 (Alexander
CoNVENTION, supra
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In addition to reiterating these general themes, the records of
the Virginia Ratifying Convention contain specific discussions of
the scope of the treaty power.125 These discussions confirm that the
Founders did in fact envision limitations on the treaty power. Dur
ing the Virginia convention, Anti-Federalists like Patrick Henry
charged that under the proposed Constitution, the treaty-makers
could "make any treaty. . . . as they please."126 In response, Feder
alist defenders of the Constitution strenuously denied that the
treaty power was unlimited. Madison stated, for example: "The ex
ercise of the power must be consistent with the object of the delega
tion. . . . The object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with
foreign nations, and is extemal."127 He further explained that the
Founders had not specified the proper subject matters of treaties in
order to preserve flexibility, not because the power was unlim
ited.128 Consistent with this view, Edmund Randolph remarked
that "neither the life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular
right of any state, can be affected by a treaty."1�9 And, perhaps
most broadly, George Nicholas stated that no treaty could be made
"which shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or incon
sistent with the delegated powers. "130 Thus, when the question of the
treaty power's scope was specifically discussed, the Founders did
express the view that it was subject to constitutional limitations. As
Charles Lofgren has explained, " [t]hose Virginia Federalists who
Hamilton); see also Kramer, supra note 46, at 1495 ("[T]here does seem to have been wide
consensus on a few issues, among them that the powers of the national government were to
be limited and that courts would play a role in policing the limits.").
125. Statements made during the state ratifying conventions are important evidence of
the original understanding of the Constitution - perhaps an even more important source of
original meaning than the statements made during the Constitutional Convention. See
RAKOVE, supra note 121, at 16-18; see also James Madison, Speech on the Jay Treaty (April 4,
1796), in VI THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 263, 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) ("If we
were to look . . . for the meaning of the [Constitution] beyond the face of the instrument, we
must look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conven
tions, which accepted and ratified the Constitution.").
126. THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF THE CoMMONWEALTII OF VIRGINIA, re
printed in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 109, at 513 [hereinafter VIRGINIA DEBATES]; see
also, e.g., id. at 509 ("The President and Senate can make any treaty whatsoever.") (state
ment of George Mason). There were similar Anti-Federalist statements in the press. See,
e.g., LETTER IV FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITU
TION, supra note 113, at 276 (asserting that the treaty power is "absolute").
127. VmGINIA DEBATES, supra note 126, at 514.

128. See id. at 514-15; see also ABRAHAM BALDWIN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(March 14, 1796), reprinted in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 109, at
370 (explaining that the Founders purposely left the treaty clause "a little ambiguous and
uncertain").
129. VIRGINIA DEBATES, supra note 126, at 504.
130. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
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discussed the issue thus perceived constitutional limits to treaties
beyond the minimal requirements that they be properly made. "131
Statements made shortly after the ratification period, although
not technically part of the original understanding, may nevertheless
shed light on that understanding. It is significant, therefore, that
the views expressed by the Federalists during the Virginia Conven
tion were reiterated in the subsequent debates in 1796 over whether
the House of Representatives had the power to inquire into the
making of the Jay Treaty. This treaty - the first adopted by the
United States after ratification of the Constitution - was between
the United States and Great Britain and was negotiated by John Jay
while he was serving concurrently as Minister to Great Britain and
Chief Justice of the United States. 132 The treaty addressed, among
other things, the withdrawal of military forces from American and
British territories, indemnification of war-time creditors, and cer
tain boundary disputes. The treaty was extremely controversial in
the United States because, among other things, it was perceived by
many people as being too conciliatory to the British. In 1796,
President Washington asked the House of Representatives to ap
propriate funds to implement the Treaty. In response, the Republi
cans in the House introduced a resolution asking the President to
provide the House with the executive papers reflecting the negoti
ating history of the treaty.133
During the debates over this resolution, numerous representa
tives expressed the view that the treaty power was limited in scope.
James Hillhouse, for example, stated that a treaty must relate "to
objects within the province of the Treaty-making power, a power
131. CliARLEs A. LoFGREN, "GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE" 151
(1986); see also id. (noting that the Virginia ratification debates reflected "the view that trea
ties would be restricted to foreign objects {but with recognition that this was an expansive
category)"). This is not to say that the Federalists were all of one mind on this issue. Hamil
ton, in particular, seems to have had a very expansive {although not unlimited) view of the
treaty power. In a letter to George Washington in 1795, he stated: "A treaty cannot be made
which alters the constitutions of the country, or which infringes any express exceptions to the
power of the Constitution of the United States. But it is difficult to assign any other bounds
to the power." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (July 9, 1795), in 5
THE WoRKS OF ALExANoER IlAMILToN 158-59 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
132. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8
Stat. 116.
133. After substantial debate, the resolution passed 62-37. Washington nevertheless re
fused to turn over the papers. See Message from George Washington to the House of Repre
sentatives of the United States {Mar. 30, 1796), in 1 A CoMPlLATION OF THE MEssAoES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 187 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). For an excel
lent discussion of the negotiation of the Jay Treaty and the House debates, see STANLEY M.
ELKINS & Eruc L. McKrrruCK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM, ch. IX {1993); see also SAMUEL F.
BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY JN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (rev. ed. 1962); JERALD A.
COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1970).
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which is not unlimited."134 He further stated that "[t]he objects
upon which it can operate are understood and well defined, and if
the Treaty-making power were to embrace other objects, their do
ings would have no more binding force than if the Legislature were
to assume and exercise judicial powers under the name of legisla
tion."135 Other representatives making similar statements included
Daniel Buck,136 James Madison,137 Theodore Sedgwick,138 and Sa
muel Smith.139 Importantly, Madison observed that a "candid and
collected view" of the state ratification debates made clear that the
treaty-making power had been understood as being limited in
scope.140
Restrictions on the treaty power also were made a part of the
Senate's Manual of Parliamentary Procedure, drafted by Thomas
Jefferson between 1797 and 1801, when he was Vice-President (and
thus President of the Senate).141 In the Manual, Jefferson noted
that the Constitution did not define "[t]o what subject this power
extends" and that the Founders were not "entirely agreed among
ourselves" on this issue.142 He explained that the treaty power was
nevertheless impliedly limited in at least four ways. First, it had to
"concern the foreign nation party to the contract."143 Second, it
covered "only those subjects which are usually regulated by
treaty."144 Third, it did not cover "the rights reserved to the states;
for surely the President and Senate cannot do by treaty what the
whole government is interdicted from doing in any way."145 Fourth,
it did not apply to "those subjects of legislation in which [the Con134. 5 ANNALS OF CoNGRESS 660 (1796).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 432 ("[I]f the PRESIDENT has assumed powers not delegated to him by the
people in making and proclaiming this Treaty, it is void in itself . . . . ).
137. See id. at 671 (stating that "it is a sound rule of construction that what is forbidden to
be done by all the branches of Government conjointly, cannot be done by one or more of
them separately").
138. See id. at 516 ("The power of treating between independent nations might be classed
under the following heads: 1. To compose and adjust differences, whether to terminate or to
prevent war. 2. To form contracts for mutual security or defence; or to make Treaties, offen
sive or defensive. 3. To regulate an intercourse for mutual benefit, or to form Treaties of
commerce.").
139. See id. at 597 ("The 'Ireaty power is in its nature limited.").
140. See id. at 777.
141. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: For the Use of the
Senate of the United States, in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 420, 420 (Wtlbur S.
Howell ed., 1988).
142. Id. at 420.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 420-21.
145. Id. at 421.
"
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stitution] gave a participation to the House of Representatives . "146
Jefferson's fourth suggested limitation - that the treaty power did
not apply to matters that could otherwise be regulated by Congress
- "has been consistently rejected."147 But both the subject matter
and federalism limitations he suggested appear to have been consis
tent with the prevailing views of the time.148
Early opinions of the Attorney General also suggested limita
tions on the treaty power. An 1819 opinion from the Attorney
General, for example, stated that the federal government could not
alter by treaty state inheritance law concerning real property. 149
And an 1831 opinion stated that the federal government is "under a
constitutional obligation to respect [the reserved powers of the
states] in the formation of treaties." 150 Other government officials,
by contrast, endorsed a subject matter rather than states'-rights lim
itation on the treaty power. John Calhoun, for example, stated in

1816 (while he was a member of the House of Representatives) that
treaties were proper as long as they "concern[ ] our foreign
relations."151
The belief that there were subject matter or federalism limita
tions on the treaty power also was reflected in the views of early
constitutional scholars. William Rawle stated that the treaty power
was appropriate only for those subjects "which properly arise from
intercourse with foreign nations," and he listed those subjects as
"peace, alliance, commerce, neutrality, and others of a similar na
ture."152 Joseph Story stated in his constitutional law treatise that,
"though the [treaty] power is thus general and unrestricted, it is not
to be so construed, as to destroy the fundamental laws of the state"
146. Id.
147. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 37, at 813; see also QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CON·
TROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 102-03 (1922). It is possible, however, that John
Calhoun agreed with Jefferson on this point. See infra note 151. But see HENKIN, supra note
4, at 397 (arguing that Calhoun simply meant to say "that treaties cannot legislate directly").
148. See George A. Fmch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of the United
States Within Constitutional Limits, 48 AM. J. INTI.. L. 57, 61 (1954) ("Jefferson's views un
doubtedly represented the consensus of the Founding Fathers.").
149. See 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 275 (1819). Contrast this with the Hague Convention on the
Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons, discussed supra text ac
companying notes 90-91.
150. 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 437 (1831).
151. 29 ANNALS OF CoNGRESs 531 (1816). Calhoun also stated, perhaps echoing
Jefferson, that "[a] treaty never can legitimately do that which can be done by law." Id. at
532. Calhoun later went on to serve as Secretary of War under President Monroe, Vice
President under Presidents John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, U.S. Senator, and Sec
retary of State under President 'fyler.
152. WrLLIAM RAWLE, A VIEw oF nm CONSTITUTION oF nm UNITED STATES 57-58
(1825).
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and "cannot supersede, or interfere with any other of [the Constitu
tion's] fundamental provisions."153 Subsequent nineteenth-century
constitutional scholars echoed these comments.154 As some of
these scholars explained, the Founders did not enumerate subject
matter limitations on the treaty power in order to preserve flexibil
ity, not because they thought the power unlimited.155
In sum, although the primary focus of the Founders' attention
was on the treaty process rather than on the scope of the treaty
power, when they addressed that issue the Founders, as well as
early scholars and government officials, made clear that the treaty
power was not unlimited in scope. In particular, there appears to
have been an understanding that the treaty power was limited
either by subject matter, by the reserved powers of the states, or
both. It could hardly have been otherwise, for, as noted above, the
Constitution was viewed as delegating

limited powers to the federal

government.156 Without subject matter or federalism restrictions
on the treaty power, the federal government would have had essen
tially unrestricted authority vis-a-vis the states, thereby contra
dicting one of the core assumptions of the Founders.151
153. 3

JOSEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES

§ 1502 (1833). By "state," Story appears to have been referring to the U.S. nation-state rather

than the constituent U.S. states. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL StiPREMACY: TREATY
PowER vs. STATE POWER 97 (1913). Nevertheless, his belief that the treaty power was lim
ited by the "fundamental laws" of this country and the "fundamental provisions" of the Con
stitution presumably included a belief that the treaty power was limited by states' rights. This
belief would be consistent with Story's view of the Constitution as "an instrument of limited
and enumerated powers." 3 STORY, supra, § 1900.
154. See, e.g., THOMAS M. CooLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 117 (3d ed. 1898) (stating that the treaty power "is
subject to the implied restriction that nothing can be done under it which changes the consti
tution of the country, or robs a department of the government or any of the States of its
constitutional authority"); 1 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 373
n.1 (1895) (noting that the treaty power is subject to those limitations "arising from the na
ture of the government itself and of that of the States"); 2 JoHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 727 (1899) (arguing that the treaty power does not
allow regulation of the "internal concerns of the country"); HERMANN VON HoLST, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 202-03 (Alfred Bishop Mason
trans. 1887) ("As to the extent of the treaty-power, the constitution says nothing, but it evi
dently cannot be unlimited. . . . It is certain that no authority granted by the constitution to
any of the factors of government can be withdrawn from it by treaty.").
155. See, e.g., RAWLE, supra note 152, at 57-58; see also WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER,
OUTLINES OF THE CoNSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 136 (1833).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
157. Several early twentieth-century commentators stated this point well. See HENRY ST.
GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER UNDER THE CONSTITU
TION OF THE UNITED STATES § 123, at 140 (1915) ("The argument is irresistible that if the
whole scheme and genius of the Constitution was to save the ungranted powers of the States
from interference by the Federal Government, that the Framers of the Constitution would
not have secured these against the ravages of all departments of the Government, and then
quietly bestowed upon one of its branches, the treaty-power, the power to absorb them all.");
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Nineteenth-Century Understanding

Proponents of a broad view of the treaty power sometimes also
rely on nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions. They argue
that, even if the Founding materials might support limitations on
the treaty power, the Supreme Court repudiated such limitations
during the nineteenth century. Professor Henkin, for example, as
serts that any federalism limitation on the treaty power was "re
peatedly rejected by the Supreme Court" in the nineteenth
century.158 In fact, while it is true that the Supreme Court in the
nineteenth century upheld the validity of a number of treaties, the
Court frequently expressed the view that the treaty power was lim
ited either by subject matter, states' rights, or both. In addition, this
assumption appears to have been shared by the treaty makers
themselves.
The Supreme Court never held in the nineteenth century that
the treaty power was immune from federalism limitations. It did
emphasize, as Henkin and others have pointed out, that treaties are
supreme over state law.159 This proposition is, of course, evident
from the constitutional text.160 To say that treaties are supreme
federal law, however, is not to say that the treaty power is unlimited
in scope.

As one early twentieth-century scholar explained:

"[W]hile many of the decisions contain broad general statements to
1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
67 (1910) ("To accept [a plenary treaty power) would be at once to overturn the long line of
decisions that have held the United States Government to be one of limited, enumerated
powers."); William E. Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power of the President and
Senate ofthe United States (pt. 2), 57 U. PA. L. R:sv. 528, 536 (1909) (arguing that it makes no
sense to conclude that the states reserved rights against the exercise of legislative power which is done by the House, Senate, and President combined - "while at the same time
surrendering their most vital powers of self-government to two of the same three depart
ments of the same government").

158. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 190; see also, e.g., 2 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE
TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 6-62 (1902); CORWIN, supra note 153, at
131-32; John B. Whitton & J. Edward Fowler, Bricker Amendment - Fallacies and Dangers,
48 AM. J. lNn.. L. 23, 34 (1954).
159. See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 483-89 (1879); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 454, 457-58 (1806); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796) (Chase, J.).
160. See U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A)ll treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .") . Moreover,
the drafting history of the Constitution makes clear that the Founders envisioned that, under
the new Constitution, treaties would be binding on the states. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST,
supra note 114, No. 22 (Alexander Hanrllton), at 151; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No.
3 (John Jay), at 43-44; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 38 (James Madison), at 238.
Indeed, "(t]he inability of the central government under the Articles of Confederation to
secure compliance by the states with the nation's treaty obligations was among the principal
animating causes of the Framers' decision to establish a new government under a new Consti·
tution, rather than simply amend the Articles of Confederation." Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 CowM. L. R:sv. 1082, 1102 (1992).
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the effect that treaties are the supreme law of the land, there is
always the accompanying qualification that it must be a constitu
tional treaty, in order to be so considered."161 Indeed, such a limita
tion was essential given the Court's repeated reaffirmation during
this period, both before and after the Civil War, that the powers of
the federal government are limited and enumerated .162
Consistent with this proposition, the Court in numerous cases
stated that the treaty power was limited in scope. Some of the
Court's decisions suggest a subject matter limitation on the treaty
power. Thus, for example, the Court stated in several decisions that
treaties must concern "proper subjects of negotiation." 163 In other
decisions, the Court suggested a states'-rights limitation. Perhaps
the best example is the Court's decision in

New Orleans

v.

United

States. 164

In that case, the United States had by treaty acquired the
province of Louisiana from France, which had in tum acquired it

from Spain. Prior to the treaty, the King of Spain had held certain
public properties in the City of New Orleans in trust for the City.
The issue was whether, pursuant to the treaty, the federal govern
ment had acquired similar trust rights over the properties, or
whether the properties instead were now fully in the control of the
City. In holding that the City had control, the Court explained that
the federal government "is one of limited powers" and that its au
thority cannot be "enlarged under the treaty-making power."165
The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause did not encompass
the trust power that had been exercised by the King of Spain and
that "the t reaty cannot give this power to the federal
government." 166
Similar statements, albeit often in dicta, are found in other
Court decisions during this period .167 Moreover, a

Supreme

161. Miller, supra note 108, at 544; see also, e.g., Hauenstein, 100 U.S. at 490 (acknowledg
ing that "[t]here are doubtless limitations of this power").
162. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636 (1882); Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
163. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1890); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889);
Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872).
164. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662.
165. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 736.
166. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 737.
167. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. at 267 (noting that the treaty power is subject to
those limitations "arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States");
Prevost v. Grenaux, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1, 7 (1856) ("[C]ertainly a treaty . . . could not divest
rights of property already vested in the State."); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,
466 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) ("[A]ny treaty or law of Congress invading [a power
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number of decisions during this period suggested both a subject
matter and a states'-rights limitation on the treaty power. In a case
involving the power of a state to extradite a person to a foreign
country, for example, the Court stated that the treaty power covers
"all those subjects, which in the ordinary intercourse of nations had
usually been made subjects of negotiation and treaty; and which are

and the distribution of
powers between the general and state governments. "168 Similarly, in
consistent with the nature of our institutions,

a case involving a land treaty with the Cherokee Indi�s, the Court
stated that treaties may deal with "all those objects which in the
intercourse of nations had usually been regarded as the proper sub
jects of negotiation and treaty, if not inconsistent with the nature of
our government

and the relation between the States and the United

States. "169
Despite this language, proponents of a broad view of the treaty
power point out that the Court upheld treaties during this period
that concerned matters typically regulated by the states. Most nota
bly, the Court upheld a number of treaties giving foreigners certain
property rights equal to those enjoyed by citizens.17° These treaties
did intrude to some extent on state regulation of property owner
ship, and federalism concerns sometimes were invoked in opposi
tion to these treaties.171 But the treaties did not purport to regulate
the relationship between states and their own citizens, or even citi
zens from other states in the nation. They regulated only the treat
ment of aliens, in return for similar treatment of U.S. citizens
residing abroad. In that sense, the treaties were quite naturally
viewed as regulating this country's inter-national relations. As one
court explained, after reviewing these cases: "If there is one object
more than another which belongs to our political relations, and
which ought to be the subject of treaty regulations, it is the exten
sion of this comity which is so highly favored by the liberal spirit of
the age, and so conducive in its tendency to the peace and amity of
nations. "172
reserved by the States] . . . would be a usurpation of power."); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504, 613 (1847) (Daniel, J., concurring) ("Treaties, to be valid, must be made within
the scope of the [delegated] powers.").
168. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840) (emphasis added).
169. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872) (emphasis added).
170. See, e.g., Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181, 189 (1825); Hughes v. Edwards,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489, 489 (1824); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453, 453 (1819);
Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 262 (1817).
171. See infra text accompanying notes 173-76.
172. People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381, 384-85 (1855).
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Even in the context of these treaties, the U.S. treaty makers ex
pressed concern regarding states' rights, and in a number of in
stances acted to protect such rights. Ralston Hayden has
documented how, between 1830 and 1860, "the Senate and the ex
ecutive entertained grave and increasing doubts concerning their
authority to make treaties" concerning rights to real property and
how "in every particular instance in which conflict arose the treaty
in question was amended to bring it more nearly into accord with
the states' rights theory."173 Thus, for example, he explains that,
when President Fillmore submitted a proposed treaty between the
United States and Switzerland to the Senate in 1850, he asked for
and obtained amendments from the Senate to protect the reserved
powers of the States.174 William Mikell similarly has documented
several instances in the nineteenth century when the treaty makers
made treaties contingent on state agreement.175 He describes, for
example, an 1853 Consular Convention with France, in which the
provision giving a property right to French citizens was made con
tingent on state laws permitting such a right. As for those states
that did not permit such a right, "the President engage[d] to recom
mend to them the passage of such laws as may be necessary for the
purpose of conferring this right."176
In the early part of the twentieth century, perhaps prompted by
the increasingly active role of the United States in international
trade and international politics, there was substantial debate over
whether the treaty power was limited by the reserved powers of the
states. Scholars lined up on both sides of this issue. The most
prominent supporters of the states'-rights view included Henry St.
George Tucker, John Bassett Moore, and William Mikell.177 The
most prominent opponents of this view included Charles Butler,
Edward Corwin, and Quincy Wright.178 Few of the opponents of
173. Ralston Hayden, The States' Rights Doctrine and the Treaty-Making Power, 22 AM.
HIST. REv. 566, 585 (1917).
174. See id. at 575-76.
175. See Mikell, supra note 157, at 555-56.
176. CONSULAR CoNVENTION OF 1853, art. VII, reprinted in 1 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS,
lNTERNATIONAL Acrs, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS 528, 531 (William M. Malloy ed.,
1910); see also TucKER, supra note 157, § 19, at 20-21 (quoting letter from John Hay in the
Department of State noting that a treaty with Great Britain concerning treatment of foreign
insurance companies would not be feasible because of domestic concerns relating to the inva
sion of state prerogatives).
177. See 5 JoHN BASSETT MooRE, A DIGEST OF lNTERNATIONAL LAw § 736, at 166
(1906); TUCKER, supra note 157, § 297, at 339; Mikell, supra note 157, at 557-58.
178. See 1 BUTLER, supra note 158, at 6; CORWIN, supra note 153, at 296; WRIGHT, supra
note 147, at 89. Charles Butler was the first scholar to directly challenge the view that the
treaty power was limited by the reserved powers of the states. See G. Edward White, The
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the states'-rights view,�however, embraced the other component of
the nationalist view - that the treaty power also is unlimited by
subject matter.179 And other constitutional scholars in this period
expressed the view that the treaty power was in fact limited by sub
ject matter.180 Moreover, U.S. officials continued to express the
view that the United States could not regulate by treaty matters
reserved to the states.181
In sum, although the Supreme Court upheld a number of trea
ties in the nineteenth century, it did not suggest that the treaty
power was unlimited. Indeed, in many of these cases the Court ex
pressly stated that the power was limited by subject matter, states'
rights, or both. Such limitations also were reflected, as noted
above, in the views of the treaty makers themselves. The states'
rights issue became highly contested in the academic community in
the early twentieth century, but even then many commentators ap
peared to assume at least a subject matter limitation.
III.

REmcrroN OF

TENTH AMENDMENT AND SUBJECT

MATIER LIMITATIONS

In this Part, I explain how each of the two components of the
nationalist view of the treaty power became orthodoxy. I :first dis
cuss the rejection of Tenth Amendment limitations on the scope of
the treaty power, and I then discuss the rejection of any meaningful
Transfonnation ofthe Constitutional Regime ofForeign Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. (forthcom
ing Feb. 1999).
179. See, e.g., CHARLES H. BURR, THE TREATY MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
285 (1912) (noting that "treaties must only contain provisions which in the usual and normal
intercourse of nations should properly become the subject of treaties" and that the treaty
making power does not allow for "the accomplishment of an internal change in the govern
ment of one sovereign party to a treaty"); CoRWIN, supra note 153, at 18 (stating that the
treaty power "must be confined to its proper business"); NICHOLAS PENDLETON MITCHELL,
STATE lN:rERESTS IN AMERICAN TREATIES 154 (1936) (concluding that reserved power limi
tations "may be ignored, so long as the subject of negotiation is a proved national interest,
and properly a matter for international treatment"); Wright, supra note 112, at 258 ("The
immunity from treaty interference of certain State powers can only be sustained by showing
that they cover a subject-matter inherently inappropriate for treaty negotiations. That there
are matters within State legislative competence thus excluded from treaty making is doubt
less true."); see also Arthur Littleton, Note, The Treaty Power and the Tenth Amendment, 68
U. PA. L. REv. 160, 162 (1919) ("[E)ven those who would grant the widest limits to the
treaty-making power do not on that account assert that the President and the Senate have a
limitless field of subjects about which to negotiate with foreign countries.").
180. See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY, supra note 157, § 216 (noting that the subject matter of trea
ties must be of "international concern"); cf. ROBERT T. DEVLIN, THE TREATY PowER
UNDER THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 143, at 141 (1908) (stating that "it
cannot be said that the treaty-making power is unlimited," but also noting that "[w)hat the
limits are, no one can correctly state").
181. See HAROLD w. STOKE, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATE 61, 113
(1931) (describing U.S. objections to labor conventions).
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subject matter limitation on the treaty power. As I explain, these
two components of the nationalist view have developed largely in
isolation, and there has been little attempt to consider the implica
tions for American federalism of combining them.
A.

Rejection of Tenth Amendment Limitations

As discussed above, the existence of states'-rights limitations on
the treaty power was assumed at various times during the nine
teenth century.182 This assumption was reflected not only in
Supreme Court decisions, but also in the statements and actions of
the political branches.183 The states'-rights issue then became the
subject of substantial academic debate during the early part of the
twentieth century, with leading commentators on both sides.184
The conventional wisdom is that the death knell to the states'rights view came in 1920, with the Supreme Court's decision in
Missouri v. Holland.185 The Holland case, "perhaps the most fa
mous and most discussed case in the constitutional law of foreign
affairs,"186 involved the constitutionality of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act of 1918.187 This Act implemented a 1916 treaty between
the United States and Great Britain that was designed to protect
birds migrating in the United States and Canada.188 Among other
things, the Act made it unlawful to hunt or capture any migratory
birds covered by the terms of the Convention. The State of Mis
souri argued that the Act unconstitutionally interfered with states'
rights in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Missouri pointed out
that two district courts already had held a similar statute, which had
been enacted before the treaty, to be beyond Congress's commerce
powers.189
182. See supra section II.B.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 173·76.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 177-78.
185. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). For an excellent discussion of this case, see LoFGREN, supra
note 131, ch. 4.
186. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 190.
187. Migratory Bird 'I!eaty Act, Aug. 16, 1916, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (current ver
sion at 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994) (amending the Act to include treaties with Mexico, Japan, and
the U.S.S.R.)).
188. See Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
39 Stat. 1702. Great Britain at that time handled Canada's foreign relations. See Jeffrey L.
Friesen, Note, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in Constitutional Federations:
Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1415, 1428 (1994).
189. See Brief for Appellant at 42, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1919) (No. 609)
(citing United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914); United States v. McCullagh,
221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915)); see also Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (referring to these decisions).
The co=erce power was perceived to be much narrower at the time of Holland than it is

424

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:390

In rejecting Missouri's argument, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Holmes, acknowledged that the Act might be outside the
scope of the Commerce Clause.190 The Court stated, however, that
any limits on the treaty power "must be ascertained in a different
way" from limits on domestic powers.191 The Court pointed out
that the treaty in question did not "contravene any prohibitory
words to be found in the Constitution" but rather was alleged to
violate "some invisible radiation from the general terms of the
Tenth Amendment."192 To show a violation of states' rights here,
the Court said, "it is not enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment
. . . because by Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is dele
gated expressly, and by Article VI treaties made under the author
ity of the United States . . . are declared the supreme law of the
land."193 In concluding that there was no violation of states' rights,
the Court observed that the treaty concerned "a national interest of
very nearly the first magnitude" that could be protected "only by
national action in concert with that of another power."194
There was some concern after this decision that the treaty
power might not be subject to any constitutional restraints, includ
ing the individual rights provisions of the Bill of Rights.19S This
concern was due in part to an observation by the Court, based on its
reading of the Supremacy Clause, that "[a]cts of Congress are the
supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Con
stitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the
authority of the United States."196 As one commentator noted af
ter the decision, the Court's "hint that there may be no other test to
be applied than whether the treaty has been duly concluded inditoday. Cf. United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1480·82 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
Eagle Protection Act as a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power).
190. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432-33.
191. See 252 U.S. at 433.
192. 252 U.S. at 433-34.
193. 252 U.S. at 432.
194. 252 U.S. at 435. Here, the Court was echoing the U.S. government's argument that
the regulation in question "can be accomplished only by concert of action on the part of two
or more States or countries." 252 U.S. at 428. Justices Van Devanter and Pitney dissented
without opinion. See 252 U.S. at 435.
195. Decisions before Holland had indicated, however, that the treaty power was subject
to constitutional restraints. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 {1890) {"It would
not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution
forbids . . . ."); The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 {1870) ("It need
hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in viola
tion of that instrument."); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (noting that
courts are not to disregard the terms of treaties "unless they violate the Constitution of the
United States").
196. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
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cates that the court might hold that specific constitutional limita
tions in favor of individual liberty and property are not applicable
to deprivations wrought by treaties. " 197
This concern was partially alleviated by the Supreme Court in a
1957 decision, Reid v. Covert. 198 In the consolidated cases at is
sue,199 military courts had convicted two wives of U.S. servicemen
of murdering their husbands on foreign bases. Executive agree
ments between the United States and the host countries permitted
U.S. military courts to exercise jurisdiction over the offenses. Nev
ertheless, the wives argued that their trials were unconstitutional
because they were conducted without a grand jury indictment and a
trial by jury. The Court agreed, with a plurality of the Court stating
that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the
Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free
from the restraints of the Constitution. "200 The plurality distin
guished Holland, noting that the treaty in Holland "was not incon
sistent with any specific provision of the Constitution."201 There
had been no Tenth Amendment problem in Holland, explained the
plurality, because "[t]o the extent that the United States can validly
make treaties, the people and the States have delegated their power
to the National Government and the Tenth Amendment is no
barrier. "20 2

In distinguishing Holland,

the plurality in Reid may have broad

ened it. The plurality read Holland as standing for the proposition
that a valid treaty is not subject to any Tenth Amendment limita
tions. It was possible to read

Holland,

however, as holding simply

that there are some actions that the federal government can take
pursuant to the treaty power that it cannot take pursuant to the
197. Thomas Reed Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-20, 19 MICH. L. REv. 1, 13 (1920);
see also, e.g., Forrest Revere Black, Missouri v. Holland
A Judicial Milestone on the Road
to Absolutism, 25 ILL. L. REv. 911, 914-16 (1931) (making the same point).
198. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
199. The Court's decision addressed two consolidated cases, which were before the Court
on rehearing. For the Court's original decisions in these cases, see Kinsella v. Krueger, 351
U.S. 470 (1956), and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956). In those decisions, the Court did
not reach the issue of the scope of the treaty power.
200. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16. The Court explained that the reason the treaties referred to in
Article VI "were not limited to those made in 'pursuance' of the Constitution was so that
agreements made by the United States under the Articles of Confederation . . . would remain
in effect." 354 U.S. at 16-17. Early historical materials appear to confirm this reading. See
Notes of James Madison (Aug. 25, 1787), in 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 109, at 417; see also LoFGREN, supra note 131, at 148-55; RAWLE, supra note 152,
at 60.
201. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18.
202. 354 U.S. at 18 (citing for that proposition United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 12425 (1941), and the authorities collected there).
-
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commerce power. In other words, the treaty power, far from con
ferring on the federal government unlimited power vis-a-vis the
states, confers a different (and in some cases broader) power than
that conferred pursuant to the Commerce Clause.203 The Court in
Holland did, after all, note that "[w]e do not mean to imply that
there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power,"204 and it
also emphasized the national interest at stake in the treaty in ques
tion.20s Moreover, the Court stated that "[w]e must consider what
this country has become in deciding what [the Tenth] Amendment
has reserved,"206 perhaps suggesting that the Tenth Amendment's
restrictions had changed over time but were not irrelevant.207 Nev
ertheless, the construction of Holland by the Reid plurality is the
one that has generally been accepted by lower courts208 and com
mentators,209 and the Supreme Court has yet to revisit the issue.
During the 1950s, there was a vigorous effort, led by Senator
Bricker of Ohio and Frank Holman of the American Bar Associa
tion, to overturn Holland by means of a constitutional amend
ment. 210 There were numerous versions of the "Bricker
203. For one commentator who read Holland in this narrower way, see C.M. Micou,
Comment, The Treaty Making Power and the Constitution, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 91, 95 (1921).
204. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
205. See 252 U.S. at 435; see also LoFGREN, supra note 131, at 138-40 (discussing the
Court's "national interest test").
206. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
207. See LoFGREN, supra note 131, at 142; Jay Lloyd Jackson, The Tenth Amendment
Versus the Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution ofthe United States (pt. 2), 14 VA. L.
R.Ev. 441, 444 (1928).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1998); Palila v. Hawaii Dept.
of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 994 (D. Haw. 1979); Tokaji v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 67 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937); People v. Jandreau, 185 N.W.2d 375,
380 (Mich. 1971).
209. See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 191; 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JoHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.5, at 509 (2d ed. 1992); TRIBE, supra note 43, at 227;
Damrosch, supra note 14, at 530; Posner & Spiro, supra note 75, at 1213 n.24. But see Con·
kle, supra note 57, at 664 (observing that "the Court [in Holland] did not reject the federal·
ism argument out of hand" but rather "balanced the competing interests that were at stake");
Marci A. Hamilton, Slouching Toward Globalization: Charting the Pitfalls in the Drive to
Internationalize Religious Human Rights, 46 EMORY LJ. 307, 317 (1997) (book review) (not·
ing that the Court in Holland "did not . . . say that any time the President signs, and the
Senate approves, a treaty the states' rights are automatically controverted"). Some of the
nationalist commentators do hold out the possibility that there are a few dramatic things that
could not be done to the states by treaty, such as ceding a portion of a state's territory to a
foreign nation without the state's consent or modifying the republican government of a state.
See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 4, at 193.
210. See generally NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RlGlITS TREATIES AND THE
SENATE (1990); DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST
OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988). Although the American Bar Association
as an organization supported the amendment, its Section on International and Comparative
Law opposed it. For the hearings on the proposed amendment, see Treaties and Execlllive
Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judici·
·
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Amendment," one of which provided that "[a] treaty shall become
effective as internal law in the United States only through legisla
tion which would be valid in the absence of a treaty."211 The pro
posed amendment never received the approval of the Senate,
although one version came close.212 During the time this amend
ment was being considered, there was, once again, substantial aca
demic discussion of the proper scope of the treaty power.213
The Bricker Amendment controversy died out for several rea
sons. First, the Reid decision, discussed above, addressed the con
cern expressed by some proponents of the amendment that the
treaty power might not be subject even to the individual rights pro
tections of the Constitution.214 Second, during this period, the
Supreme Court was increasingly recognizing expansive domestic
federal power, including the power to regulate extensively in the
human rights area.215 Third, the treaty makers indicated that they
would exercise substantial self-restraint with respect to overriding
state prerogatives. Thus, for example, the Senate attached a reser
vation in 1951 to the U.S. ratification of the Charter of the Organi
zation of American States stating that
none of its provisions shall be considered as enlarging the powers of
the Federal Government of the United States or limiting the powers
of the several states of the Federal Union with respect to any matters
recognized under the Constitution as being within the reserved pow
ers of the several states .216

A similar example is the Senate's statement in connection with its
consent in 1961 to the Convention on the Organization for Eco
nomic Cooperation and Development that "nothing in the convenary, 84th Cong. (1955); Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J.
Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. (1953); Treaties
and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 130 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. (1952).

211. S. REP. No. 83-412, at 1 (1953). For the various major versions, see KAUFMAN, supra
note 210, at 201-03.
212. See 100 CONG. REc. 2374-75 (1954) (recording a vote of 60-31, one vote short of the
two-thirds requirement); see also TANANBAUM, supra note 210, at 180-81.
213. See, e.g., George A. Fmch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of the
United States Within Constitutional Limits, 48 AM. J. INrL. L. 57 (1954); Arthur E. Suther
land, Jr., Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HAR.v. L. REv. 1305 (1952); Whitton & Fowler,
supra note 158, at 23.
214. See TANANBAUM, supra note 210, at 213 (noting that the Court's decision in Reid
"undermined the case for the Bricker amendment").
215. See supra text accompanying note 42.
216. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2484,
119 U.N.T.S. 3 (U.S. ratified Dec. 27, 1951).
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tion . . . confers any power on the Congress to take action in fields
previously beyond the authority of Congress."211
The approach of the federal government to human rights trea
ties has been even more restrictive. The Eisenhower administra
tion, through Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, announced in
1953 that it had no intention of becoming a party to the then
proposed human rights treaties.218 And for many years thereafter,
the Senate refused to consent to any of the major human rights
treaties submitted to it.219 The Senate recently has begun to ratify
some of these treaties, but only subject to a now-standard set of
reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) that limit
the treaties' effect on domestic law. Among other things, these
RUDs typically include a declaration that the treaty is non-self-exe
cuting, as well as a statement that the United States understands
that the treaty shall be implemented by the federal government
only to the extent that it possesses legislative and judicial power
over the matters in question, and otherwise by the state and lo
cal governments.220 These RUDs reflect "a desire not to effec-

217. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec.
14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 1751-52, 888 U.N.T.S. 179 (U.S. ratified Mar. 23, 1961).
218. See Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res.
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 825 (1953).
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219. See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 477 n.101.
220. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Con·
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CoNG. REc. S7634
(daily ed. June 24, 1994); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CoNG. REc. 8070 (Apr. 2,
1992); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136
CONG. REc. S17492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). Thus, as Professor Henkin explains:
Senator Bricker lost the constitutional battle but perhaps not his political war. In large
part because of "Brickerite" opposition, the United States long refused to adhere to
human rights covenants and conventions. When, finally, the United States adhered to
several of them, it did so subject to major reservations, understandings and declarations
HENKIN, supra note 4, at 193 n.**. Although the United States has not yet ratified the Con
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, federalism and
non-self-execution conditions have been proposed in connection with that treaty as well. See
STAFF OF SENAlE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1030 CONG., REPORT ON TIIE CONVEN·
TION ON TIIE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 10-11
(Co=. Print 1994). In consenting to the Genocide Convention, the Senate did not attach a
non-self-execution condition, but it did declare that the President was not to deposit the
instrument of ratification until implementing legislation was enacted. See U.S. Senate Reso
lution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, 132 CoNG. REc. S1378 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986).
Furthermore, the implementing legislation eventually enacted by Congress neither preempts
state law nor creates any rights against the states or the federal government. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1092 (1994).
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tuate changes to domestic law by means of the treaty-making
power."221
A final reason that the federalism controversy died out was that
many officials and commentators assumed that there was at le!'lst a
subject matter limitation on the treaty power, which reduced con
cerns about its use to regulate internal matters.222 As discussed be
low, this limitation too has now been rejected, at least in the
academic community.
B.

Rejection of Subject Matter Limitation

The second component of the nationalist view of the treaty
power - that there is no meaningful subject matter limitation on
that power - has become well accepted only recently . As dis
cussed above, a subject matter limitation appears to have been as
sumed both during the Founding and at times during the nineteenth
century.223 The Court in Holland also may have assumed the exist
ence of a subject matter limitation.224 Other decisions ·from the
early twentieth century further reflected a subject matter limitation
(albeit a broad one),225 as did some of the academic commentary .226
The existence of a subject matter limitation on the treaty power
was subsequently suggested in

1929

by Charles Evans Hughes.227

In a speech to the American Society of International Law,228
Hughes stated that the treaty power might be limited to matters of
"international concern" and thus not allow for the regulation of
matters "which normally and appropriately were within the local
221. David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1183, 1206 (1993) (referring to the RUDs attached to the Senate's ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
222. See infra text accompanying notes 223-41.
223. See supra Part II.
224. See supra text accompanying note 194.
225. See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (stating that the treaty power
is "broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations");
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (noting that the treaty power "extend[s]
to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations").
226. See supra notes 179-80.
227. Hughes was a former Secretary of State, at the time a Judge on the Permanent Court
of International Justice and the President of the American Society of International Law, and
soon to be Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
228. Although Hughes's remarks were made extemporaneously, they presumably repre
sented his fully-considered views on the subject See WILLIAM W. BISHOP, JR., lNTERNA
TIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 99 n.12 (3d ed. 1971). Professor Henkin has stated,
incorrectly in my view, that the idea of a subject matter limitation originated with Hughes.
See Louis Henkin, "International Concern" and the Treaty Power ofthe United States, 63 AM.
J. hm.. L. 272, 274 (1969).
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jurisdiction of the States."229 These remarks did not provoke sub
stantial controversy at the time. Rather, as Professor Henkin notes,
Hughes's remarks were "accepted as authority."230
Indeed, opponents of the Bricker Amendment during the 1950s
invoked the subject matter limitation in support of their argument
that the Amendment was unnecessary.

Thus, for example, an

American Bar Association committee that opposed the Amend
ment argued that it was unnecessary in part because of "the very
fundamental limitation upon the extent to which a treaty can affect
internal law in that it must concern a matter which is 'properly the
subject of negotiation with a foreign country.'"231 Similarly, Secre
tary of State Dulles stated during the Bricker hearings that a treaty
could not regulate matters "which do not essentially affect the ac
tions of nations in relation to international affairs, but are purely

internal.''232

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit came close to
formally endorsing the Hughes view in 1957. In

Power Authority of
New York v. Federal Power Commission,233 the court considered the
effect of a reservation attached by the Senate to its ratification of a
treaty with Canada concerning use of the waters of the Niagara
River. The reservation stated, among other things, that "no project
for redevelopment of the United States share of such waters shall
be undertaken until it be specifically authorized by Act of Con

gress.''234 The court observed that enforcement of this reservation
would raise a "constitutional concern"235 because the reservation
"relate[d] to a matter of purely domestic concern.''236 The court
avoided ruling on the constitutional question237 by construing the

reservation as merely "an expression of the Senate's desires and not
229. 1929 AM. SoCY. hm.. L. PRoc. 194, 194-96.
230. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 471 n.87.
231. ABA CoMM. oN CoNST. AsPEcrs oF hm.. AGREEMENTS, REPORT To SECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CoMPARATIVE LAW ON SENATE JOINT REsoLUTION 1 AND THE
KNoWLAND SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT 19 {1953) (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,
267 (1890)); see also id. at 6 ("The scope of both treaties and executive agreements is subject,
besides, to the overall limitation that they must treat subjects of proper international
concern.").
232. Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 183 (1955).
233. 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
234. 247 F.2d at 539 (quoting Treaty Between the United States and Canada Concerning
Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 694, 699).
235. 247 F.2d at 543 (quoting United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957)).
236. 247 F.2d at 543.
237. See 247 F.2d at 543.
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a part of the treaty."238 The court distinguished Holland as involv
ing a treaty "related to a 'national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude' which 'can be protected only by national action in con
cert with that of another power."'239
Although the position of the State Department on this issue va
ried to some extent during this period, it too appeared to agree that
there was a subject matter limitation, at least as a matter of policy.
Thus, for example, it stated in 1955 that " [t]reaties are not to be
used as a device for the purpose of effecting internal social changes
or to try to circumvent the constitutional procedures established in
relation to what are essentially matters of domestic concern. "240 A
number of commentators in this period also assumed that there was
a subject matter limitation on the treaty power.241
The notion of a subject matter restriction on the treaty power
perhaps reached its highest level of acceptance in 1965, when the

Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States expressly endorsed it. In its black-letter-law provisions, the
Restatement (Second) provided that the treaty power is limited to
matters "of international concern."242 The Restatement (Second)
further stated, in its comments, that international agreements "must
relate to the external concerns of the nation as distinguished from
matters of a purely internal nature."243 In support of this limita
tion, the

Restatement (Second)

noted, among other things, that

"[n]o power granted to the United States by the Constitution is



un

limited."244 It also linked the purported subject matter limitation
with the lack of a Tenth Amendment limitation on the treaty power,
238. 247 F.2d at 542.
239. 247 F.2d at 542 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920)). Even the
dissenting judge, in arguing for the validity of the reservation, acknowledged that "[i]t may
well be that, no matter how broad the power to make treaties, it is not without limits . . . ."
247 F.2d at 552 (Bastian, J., dissenting). For arguments in support of the validity of the
reservation, see Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reser
vation, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 1151 (1956).
240. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CIRCULAR No. 175 (1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. INTL. L.
784, 785 (1956). By contrast, the State Department caused some alarm with its quite differ
ent {although perhaps prescient) statement in 1950 that "[t]here is no longer any real distinc
tion between 'domestic' and 'foreign' affairs." OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, PuB. No. 3972, OuR FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1950) (General Foreign Policy Series 26,
1950).
241. See, e.g., C.H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42
MINN. L. REv. 709, 764 (1958); Randall H. Nelson, The Subject-Matter Limitation on the
Treaty-Making Power, 11 J. PUB. L. 122, 155 (1962).
242. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 117(1)(a) (1965) [hereinafter REsTATEMENT (SECOND)].
243. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 242, § 117 cmt. b.
244. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 242, § 117 cmt. d.
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noting that a treaty is constitutional, notwithstanding the reserved
powers of the states, so long as "it deals with matters of interna
tional concern and is not in conflict with any express limitations on
the powers of the government."245 The existence of a subject mat
ter limitation on the treaty power was further supported in 1967 by
the American Bar Association.246
After the publication of the Restatement (Second), however,
such a limitation also became the subject of academic criticism,
most notably from Professor Henkin. Henkin criticized this idea in
an article-in th� late 1960s,247 as well as in his famous 1972 book on
foreign affairs law.248 Henkin argued that "every treaty, regardless
of subject, serves the external purposes of the United States," and
he questioned how one could in any event distinguish "external"
from "internal" matters.249
The idea of a subject matter limitation was then expressly re
jected in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which
was first published in draft form in 1980 and subsequently published
in final form· in 1987. The Restatement (Third), for which Professor
Henkin was the Chief Reporter, declares that, "[c]ontrary to what
was once suggested, the Constitution does not require that an inter
national agreement deal only with 'matters of international con
cern.' "25° The Restatement (Third) does not cite any intervening
authority for this proposition,251 and, indeed, the one decision on
point between the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement
(Third)
the Power Authority decision - had come out essen
tially the other way.252
In what has become a rather disturbing phenomenon in the de
velopment of American foreign affairs law, the new Restatement
(Third) position, adopted without authority, is now being treated as
-

245. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 242, § 118 cmt. a.
246. See American Bar Association, Report ofthe Standing Committee on Peace and Law
Through United Nations: Human Rights Conventions and Recommendations, 1 INTI.. LAW.
600 (1967).
247. See Henkin, supra note 228.
248. See Loms HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 154 (1972).
249. Henkin, supra note 228, at 276-77.
250. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmt. c.
251. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmt. c; see also Louis Henkin,
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), 74 AM. J. INTL. L.
954, 957 (1980) (explaining the proposed change).
252. Professor Henkin briefly mentioned this change during the 1982 proceedings of the
American Society of International Law, but there apparently was no public debate or discus
sion regarding the change. See Panel Discussion, The Draft Restatement ofthe Foreign Rela
tions Law of the United States (Revised), 76 AM. Soc. INTI.. L. PROC. 184, 188-89 (1984).
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if it were black-letter law. In his recent revision pf his foreign af
fairs book, for example, Professor Henkin cites the Restatement
(Third) for the proposition that the subject matter limitation has
"now been authoritatively abandoned."253 Unfortunately, this is
not the only instance in which the Restatement (Third) has been
used in this self-fulfilling manner.254 In any event, the Restatement

(Third) 's rejection of a subject matter limitation on the treaty
power now appears to be the accepted view, at least among aca
demic commentators.255 Importantly, no one �eems to have consid
ered the implications of combining the lack of Tenth Amendment
limitations with the lack of a subject matter limitation.

IV.

CRITIQUE OF THE NATIONALIST VIEW

As we have seen, there are two components to the nationalist
view of the treaty power - the lack of Tenth Amendment limita
tions, and the lack of any meaningful subject matter limitation.

When combined, these components give the treaty-makers essen
tially unlimited power vis-a-vis the states.

In

our federalist system,

which is premised on the principle of limited and enumerated pow
ers, this result requires justification.

In

this Part,

I

examine the

three principal justifications for the nationalist view and I find that,
especially in light of recent developments, none of them is
convincing.

253. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 474 n.89.
254. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 834-37 (documenting how the Restate
ment (Third)'s position on the domestic status of customary international law lacked author
ity and yet was presented and accepted as settled law); David B. Massey, Note, How the
American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The Reasonableness Requirement of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INTI.. L. 419 (1997) (describing how the
Restatement (Third)'s position on the scope of prescriptive jurisdiction lacked authority and
yet was presented and accepted as settled law). But see Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Non
sense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith,
66 FORDHAM L. REv. 371, 377-80 (1997) (disputing the charge that the Restatement (Third)
lacked authority for its claims regarding the domestic legal status of customary international
law).
255. See, e.g., CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 38, at 166; Ackerman & Golove, supra
note 37, at 843-44; Damrosch, supra note 14, at 530; Malvina Halberstam, A Treaty is a Treaty
is a Treaty, 33 VA. J. INTI.. L. 51, 57 n.29 (1992). Professor Tribe may be one of the few
dissenters, in that he has stated that the treaty power "is legitimate only for international
agreements fairly related to foreign relations." Tribe, supra note 39, at 1261 n.133. Even he
notes, however, that "[w]ith global interdependence reaching across an ever broadening
spectrum of issues," a subject matter restriction "seems unlikely to prove a serious limita
tion." TRIBE, supra note 43, at 228.
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Delegation Argument

The purported immunity of the treaty power from federalism
limitations is often premised on what

ment.

I will call the delegation argu

This argument is that, because the treaty power has been del

egated to the federal government, exercises of that power do not
implicate the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the
states. As Professor Henkin states, "[s]ince the Treaty Power was
delegated to the federal government, whatever is within its scope is
not reserved to the states: the Tenth Amendment is not mate
rial."256 This reasoning is reflected in both
Court in

Holland stated

Holland and Reid.

The

that "it is not enough to refer to the Tenth

Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United
States, because by Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is dele
gated expressly."257 Similarly, the plurality in

Reid noted

that, "[t]o

the extent that the United States can validly make treaties, the peo
ple and the States have delegated their power to the National Gov
ernment and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier."258
The delegation argument has superficial appeal.

The treaty

power, after all, is expressly delegated to the national government,
and the federal government's ratification of treaties therefore
would seem to fall within the principle of limited and enumerated
powers. Moreover, the language of the Tenth Amendment only
purports to reserve to the states "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution."259 Relying on these and other
points, Professor Henkin goes so far as to describe the delegation
argument as "clear and indisputable. "260
The fundamental fl.aw with the delegation argument, however, is
that it fails to provide any reason for giving special Tenth Amend
ment immunity to the treaty power. Although it is true that the
treaty power has been delegated to the federal government, this is
true of

all

federal powers. The power to regulate interstate com

merce, for example, also has been delegated to the federal govern
ment, but this, by itself, has not made it immune from Tenth
Amendment scrutiny. And, indeed, notwithstanding this delega
tion, the Supreme Court has held in a number of cases, including
256. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 191; see also, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 153, at 5-6; Chandler
P. Anderson, The Extent and Limitations ofthe Treaty Power Under the Constitlltion, 1 AM. J.
INTL. L. 636, 657 (1907) (making this argument).
257. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
258. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
259. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
260. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 191.
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cases decided near the time of Holland, that the Tenth Amendment
operates as a substantive restraint.261 In sum, the fact of delegation
says nothing about the scope of the delegation, and it certainly does
not establish that the delegation is unlimited in scope.262
Of course, the willingness of the Supreme Court to enforce the
Tenth Amendment as an independent limitation on

any

federal

power has varied. Although the Court has at times treated the
Tenth Amendment as an independent restraint on delegated pow
ers,263 at other times it has described the Tenth Amendment as stat
ing "but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surren(;lered."264 Under this analysis, states' rights are protected by
policing the scope of the delegated powers, not by giving immunity
to reserved state powers per se. The Court's current position on
this issue is not entirely clear, although the Court appears to be
treating the Tenth Amendment as

an

independent restraint.265 In

any event, the key point here is that whatever limitations the Tenth
Amendment does impose, it is not evident from the delegation ar
gument why these limitations should not apply to the treaty power.
Some proponents of this aspect of the nationalist view have
pointed out that, unlike its treatment of certain other delegated
powers, the Constitution expressly denies states the power to enter
261. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274-76 (1918) (invalidating statute
designed to prevent interstate shipments of products made by child labor); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 85-92 (1907) (holding that Congress did not have the power to regu
late state use of a river for the purpose of reclamation of arid lands). It would seem unlikely
that the 7-2 majority in Holland thought it was implicitly overruling those earlier decisions.
It is possible, however, that the author of the Holland decision, Justice Holmes, did intend
such a holding, given his dissent in Hammer. See 247 U.S. at 277 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
262. See Mikell, supra note 157,

at

539-40.

263. In addition to the decisions cited supra note 261, see, for example, National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), where the Court justified its invalidation of fed
eral statutory provisions "not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative
authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the
authority in that manner."

264.

United States v. Darby,

312

U.S.

100, 124 (1941).

265. In New York v. United States, 505

U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992), the Court purported to
treat the Tenth Amendment not as a restraint on delegated powers per se, but rather as a
reminder that states' rights must be considered in determining the scope of delegated powers.
At the same time, however, the Court appeared to acknowledge that its approach was func
tionally the same as applying the Tenth Amendment as an independent restraint on dele
gated powers. See 505 U.S. at 159. In a more recent decision, the Court used language
suggesting that it viewed the Tenth Amendment as an independent limitation on delegated
powers. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2379, 2383 (1997) (stating that the provi
sions in question "violate[ ] the principle of state sovereignty," are "not in accord with the
Constitution," and "run afoul" of the rule that the federal government cannot commandeer
state governments). The concurrence in that case by Justice O'Connor, the author of the
earlier New York opinion, is even more explicit on this point. See 117 S. Ct. at 2385
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment . . . .").
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into treaties.266 They Flfgue that, even if some delegated powers are
subject to Tenth Amendment limitations, this should not be the
case for delegated powers that, like the treaty power, are held ex
clusively by the federal government. This argument, however, is a
non sequitur. While it is true that the states have not reserved the
power

to enter into treaties,

this does not mean that they have not

reserved other regulatory powers that might be infringed by certain
exercises of the federal treaty power.

In

other words, the Constitu

tion's denial of state power to enter into treaties "proves that the
federal power to make treaties is

exclusive,

but it does not prove

that it is unlimited, or that [it] is not limited by the tenth amend
ment."267 The exclusivity argument breaks down even further when
it is remembered that the Constitution allows the states some ability
to enter into international agreements,268 and that many interna
tional agreements made by the federal government today take the
form of executive agreements rather than Article II treaties.269
266. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 4, at 189; Elihu Root, The Real Questions Under the
Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco School Board Resolution, 1 AM. J. INTL. L. 273, 278
(1907); Wright, supra note 112, at 257.
267. Mikell, supra note 157, at 539-40; see also, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,
274 (1918) ("The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not intended to destroy
the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment
to the Constitution.").
268. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (allowing states to enter into "Agreement[s] or
Compact[s]" with foreign nations with congressional consent); see generally Raymond S.
Rodgers, The Capacity of States of the Union to Conclude International Agreements: The
Background and Some Recent Developments, 61 AM. J. INTL. L. 1021 (1967). Some agree
ments between states and foreign nations may not even require congressional consent. The
Supreme Court has held that states may enter into interstate agreements without congres
sional consent as long as the agreements do not "tend[ ] to the increase of political power in
the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States." Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). Some state courts have applied this
standard to agreements with foreign nations. See, e.g., In re Manuel P., 263 Cal. Rptr. 447,
459 (1989) (upholding agreement between San Diego and Mexico to share information con
cerning juvenile offenders); McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 544-47 (N.D. 1917)
(upholding county's construction of a drainage ditch in cooperation with a Canadian town);
see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 cmt. f (noting that "agreements involv
ing local transborder issues, such as agreements to curb a source of pollution, to coordinate
police or sewage services, or to share an energy source, have been considered not to require
Congressional consent").
269. On its face, this exclusivity argument might appear to be supported by the Supreme
Court's approach to Congress's spending power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (giving
Congress the power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"). The
Court has suggested that the Spending Clause, unlike other Article I powers such as the
power to regulate interstate commerce, may not be subject to Tenth Amendment restraints.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66
(1935). The Court has based this suggestion, however, not on the ground that the spending
power is exclusive, but rather on the ground that federal spending decisions are not them
selves preemptive federal law. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210; see also Merritt, supra note 22, at
1577. The treaty power, by contrast, does allow for the creation of supreme federal law. See
U.S. CoNST. art. VI. It is also worth noting that the Court has said that even the spending
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The problematic nature of the delegation argument becomes
further evident when its logic is applied in the context of separation
of powers rather than federalism.270 One could argue that, like fed
eralism restrictions, separation of powers restrictions do not apply
to powers delegated exclusively to a branch of the federal govern
ment. This argument was accepted to some extent by the Supreme
Court in a much-criticized decision, United States v. Curtiss-Wright
In that case, Congress by Joint Resolution pur

Export Corp.271

ported to confer on the President the authority to implement a
criminal prohibition on the sale of arms in the United States to
countries engaged in a conflict in Latin America.

In response to the

argument that this constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the President, a plausible argument at that time in light
of the Court's precedent,272 the Court sharply distinguished be
tween federal power over external affairs and federal power over
internal affairs.

In

particular, the Court observed that "[t]he broad statement

that the federal government can exercise no powers except those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied pow
ers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated
powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal af
fairs."273 The Court explained that, whereas the states had dele
gated certain limited powers over internal affairs to the federal
government, this was not the case with respect to powers relating to
external affairs: "Since the states severally never possessed internapower "is of course not unlimited," and that the Court has articulated several restrictions on
the scope of that power, including two relating to subject matter. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 20708. For an argument that the Court should impose more restrictions on the spending power
given the Court's renewed commitment to federalism, see Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Fed
eral Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1911 (1995); see also Thomas R. McCoy &
Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REv. 85
(criticizing Dole).
270. Of course, federalism and separation of powers are not unrelated issues. If the
treaty power gives the federal government additional power vis-a-vis the states, it also gives
the treaty makers additional power vis-a-vis the other branches of the federal government.
See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 1680-81 (discussing linkage between federalism and separa
tion of powers).
271. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
272. See AL.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421-30 (1934).
273. Curtiss-Wright, 199 U.S. at 315-16. This distinction between constitutional limita
tions with respect to external affairs and those with respect to internal affairs was one that the
author of the Curtiss-Wright decision, Justice Sutherland, had made in earlier writings before
coming to the Court. See GEORGE SunmRLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WoRLD
AFFAIRS 24-47 (1919); GEORGE SunmRLAND, THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS OF
THE NATIONAL GoVERNMENT, S. Doc. No. 61-417 (1909), reprinted in 191 N. AM. REv. 373
(1910).
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tional powers, such powers could not have been carved from the
mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United
States from some other source."274 One such power is the "very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international rela
tions."275 The existence of this power, reasoned the Court, meant
that the usual separation of powers limitations on delegations of
authority to the executive branch do not apply with respect to for
eign affairs matters.276
The reasoning in

Curtiss-Wright is to some extent the separation
Holland. Just as the federalism restrictions
operated differently with respect to external matters in Holland, so
did the separation of powers restrictions in Curtiss-Wright. More
of powers analogue to

over, in both decisions, the Court distinguished between internal
matters, over which the states retained some sovereign authority,
and external matters, over which the states did not. In assessing the
validity of the delegation argument, it is therefore important to
note that the reasoning of

Curtiss-Wright

has received "withering

criticism" from commentators.277 Among other things, commenta
tors have criticized the reasoning for "carv[ing] a broad exception
to the historic conception, often reiterated, never questioned, and
explicitly reaffirmed in the Tenth Amendment, that the federal gov
ernment is one of enumerated powers only."278
Moreover, the Supreme Court arguably has repudiated the logic
of

Curtiss-Wright. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,219

the Court found a presidential order authorizing a seizure of the
nation's steel mills to be invalid, notwithstanding the President's
claim that the seizure was necessary for national defense given the
ongoing conflict in Korea. The Court stated that "[t]he President's
power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself. "280 In his famous concur
rence in that case, Justice Jackson observed that much of the
274. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316.
275. 299 U.S. at 320.
276. See 299 U.S. at 320-22.
277. See HAROLD HoNGJU KoH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990).
For examples of this criticism, see FRANCK, supra note 2, at 14-18; Michael J. Glennon, 1lvo
Views ofPresidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J.
INTI.. L. 5 (1988); David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis ofMr. Justice
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss
Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE LJ. 1 (1973).
278. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 20.
279. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
280. 343 U.S. at 585.
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Court's opinion in Curtiss-Wright had been "dictum,"281 and he re
iterated the traditional view that "the executive branch, like the
Federal Government as a whole, possesses only delegated pow
ers. "282 In its subsequent decision in Dames & Moore v. Regan,283 a
case involving a challenge to an executive agreement, the Court
largely endorsed the Youngstown approach rather than the Curtiss
Wright approach.284
Given the criticism and erosion of the separation of powers rea
soning in Curtiss-Wright, it is perhaps not surprising that propo
nents of the nationalist view do not argue that the treaty power is
immune from implied limitations arising from separation of powers.
Professor Henkin, for example, states that "[t]he Treaty Power . . .
is not limited by the powers of Congress, but it is assumed to be
subject to other radiations from the separation of powers."285 In
deed, notwithstanding Curtiss-Wright, Henkin notes specifically
that "[i]t has been assumed that constitutional limitations on dele
gation of legislative power apply as well to delegation by treaty."286
These proponents fail to explain, however, why the implied limita
tions of separation of powers should govern when the implied limi
tations of federalism do not.287 The delegation argument does not
provide such an explanation.
281. 343 U.S. at 635-36 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring).
282. 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
283. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
284. See 453 U.S. at 668-69; see also Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions:
Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1244-45 (1987) (discuss
ing how Youngstown and Dames & Moore cut back on the broad reasoning of Curtiss
Wright).
285. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 195 (citations omitted).
286. Id. at 470 n.83.
287. Cf. T UCKER, supra note 157, at 412 ("If the treaty power may not invade the powers

of Congress, or the Judiciary, or the President, would not the same prohibition apply to any
other branch of the Federal Government as well as to those? Surely there is no peculiar
sanctity that doth hedge Congress, the Judiciary, or the President, which should be denied to
the States - as integral parts of the Federal Government."). This separation of powers issue,
like the federalism issue, is becoming increasingly important. Consider, for example, the
constitutional challenges recently made against the binational panel review process estab
lished in connection with the NAFTA trade agreement. It has been argued that this process,
by delegating U.S. judicial authority to an international body, violates both the Appoint
ments Clause and Article III. See American Coalition for Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128
F.3d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding dismissal of these constitutional claims on standing and
jurisdictional grounds); see also Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitu

tionality ofBinational Arbitral Review Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1455 (1992) (arguing that the binational review process under the
predecessor treaty to NAFTA was unconstitutional); cf. CoRWIN, supra note 153, at 14
(describing how President Taft objected to a 1907 treaty establishing an international prize
court on the ground that the Constitution does not allow transfer of federal judicial power to
a non-U.S. court). Another example is the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was re
cently ratified by the United States. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
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B. Political Process Argument
In addition to making the delegation argument, proponents of
the nationalist view typically advance the political process argu
ment. 1bis argument is that the political process provides sufficient
protection of federalism, such that no substantive federalism re
striction is necessary. Proponents of this view observe, for example,
that two-thirds of the Senate must consent to treaties, and that the
states have equal representation in the Senate.288 Although some
proponents of this view correctly point out that the Founders placed
significant emphasis on the process for concluding treaties as a pro
tection for the states,289 they do not appear to claim that the
Founders intended for this process protection to be exclusive, and
any such claim likely would be unpersuasive given the Founding
materials discussed above. Instead, they appear to make more of a
stare decisis argument: there is no need to overturn the settled de
cision in Holland because states' rights are not in fact threatened by
the treaty power.
1bis sort of argument is not, of course, unique to the treaty con
text. A similar political process argument was made by commenta
tors, and eventually accepted by the Supreme Court, with respect to
federal legislative power in general. The theory was first advanced
in the 1950s by Herbert Wechsler,29° and then later more thor
oughly developed by Jesse Choper.291 Citing these writings, a 5-4
majority of the Supreme Court endorsed the political process the
ory in its 1985 Garcia decision.292 The Court concluded that "the
fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on
the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of proProduction, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13,
1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21 (1993). One scholar has made the plausible argument that
the federal government's delegation through the Convention of weapons inspection authority
to an international body violates the Appointments Clause. See John C. Yoo, The New Sov
ereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments
Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 87 (1998).
288. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 4, at 443-44 n.4; see also CORWIN, supra note 153, at
302-04; HENKIN, supra note 4, at 168, 189 n.**.
289. See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 153, at 65-74; see also supra text accompanying notes
108-09, 118-122.
290. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards ofFederalism: The Role ofthe States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
291. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvraw AND TIIB NATIONAL PoLmCAL PROCESS
(1980); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope ofthe National Power Vis-a-Vis The States: The Dispensa·
bility ofJudicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977).
292. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 n.11 (1985). The
Court also cited D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards ofFederalism Redux: Intergov
ernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1982).
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cess rather than one of result," and the Court said that "[a]ny sub
stantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must
find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation,
and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the
national political process rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of
state autonomy.' "293
Despite the Court's general endorsement of this theory in

Garcia,

there are several problems with relying on this argument

today to support the nationalist view of the treaty power. First, the
Supreme Court appears to have backed away from Garcia in recent
years. Starting with its "clear statement" requirement in Gregory v.
Ashcroft,294 through its latest "commandeering" decision, Printz v.

United States,295 the Court has steadily chipped away at the proposi
tion that federalism protections are to be left solely to the political
process. As Professor John Yoo recently explained, "[i]n these
cases, the Court has articulated its intention to establish areas of
state control that are to remain immune from federal regulation,
and it has suggested that these areas can be identified by policing
Congress' use of its enumerated powers."296 The political process
theory also has been the subject of substantial academic criticism in
recent years.297

A number of these critics have examined the

mechanics of our political process and have concluded that "[t]he
structural protections identified by Wechsler, Choper, and company
are marginal at best. "298 Professor Steven Calabresi has pointed
out, for example, that the campaign finance system, with its na
tional special interest groups and PACs, undercuts the representa293. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)); see
also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) ("Garcia holds that the [federalism]
limits are structural, not substantive
i.e., that States must find their protection from con
gressional regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined
spheres of unregulable state activity.").
294. 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
295. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
296. Yoo, supra note 46, at 1312.
297. The most prominent critical works include Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of
Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv.
752 (1995); McConnell, supra note 22, at 1485; Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988); John C.
Pittenger, Garcia and the Political Safeguards ofFe,deralism: Is There a Better Solution to the
Conundrum of the Tenth Amendment?, PUBLIUs, Wmter 1992, at 1; Andrzej Rapaczynski,
From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT.
REv. 341; Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1987); and William W. Van
Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709 (1985). See also Barry
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 362-63 (1997) (noting that "[n]umerous
commentators have questioned the soundness of the Court's reasoning" in Garcia).
298. Kramer, supra note 46, at 1520.
-
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tion of state interests, and that the incentive structure for federal
politicians favors the expansion of federal power rather than the
protection of states' rights.299
Second, the political process argument can draw little, if any,
support from the original intent of the Founders. Although the
Founders did intend for the process of making treaties - especially
the two-thirds Senate advice and consent requirement - to protect
states' rights,300 there is no evidence that they intended this to be
the only protection.301 More importantly, several key assumptions
of the Founders concerning the treaty process no longer hold true.
The Founders envisioned direct state representation in the Senate,
something that "basically evaporated \vith the adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment in 1913."302 The Founders also believed
that the Senate would play a major role in advising the President
regarding treaties, but its role fairly quickly became one merely of
consent.303

An even more significant change is that the vast major

ity of international agreements concluded by the United States to
day are executive agreements rather than Article II treaties and
thus do not depend on two-thirds Senate consent at all.304 Never
theless, these agreements are widely considered to have equal sta
tus with Article II treaties, at least if they are approved in advance
or after the fact by a majority of both houses of Congress.30s
Third, it is arguable that the political process rationale is

less

persuasive in the treaty and executive agreement context than in
the context of domestic legislation. As a number of commentators
have pointed out, the treaty and executive agreement process is
more opaque and less representative than the normal federal legis
lative process.306 Negotiations are typically conducted by the Exec299. See Calabresi, supra note 297, at 794-98.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
301. Professor John Yoo recently conducted a detailed review of the Founding materials
with regard to the protection of federalism in general and concluded that the Founders did
not intend for the political process to be the only protection. See Yoo, supra note 46, at 135791.
302. Kramer, supra note 46, at 1508. The Constitution originally provided that Senators
would be "chosen by the Legislature" of each state. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1
(amended 1913). The Seventeenth Amendment provides that Senators shall be elected "by
the people" of each state. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
303. See liENKm, supra note 4, at 177.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
305. See supra text accompanying note 37.
306. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 2, at 1475-79; John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in
Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INTL. L. 310, 323-24, 331-32 (1992);
Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy,
17 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 681, 683-719 (1996-97).
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utive, often without much public disclosure. And, as Professor
Friedman has noted, "[t]here is not much in the political process of
electing a President that suggests any particular sensitivity to state
concerns."307 Moreover, the Senate in the case of treaties, and the
entire Congress in the case of congressional-executive agreements,
is often confronted with what is essentially an up-or-down vote.
Unlike much domestic legislation, Congress has essentially no role
in drafting treaties and it has relatively little ability to modify their
terms. This has been particularly true in the context of so-called
"fast-track" legislation.308 Moreover, the costs of a down vote may
involve not only a failure to commit to the agreement in question,
but also an inability to participate in the international organization
associated with the agreement.

In

these situations, the bargaining

power of the Senate or Congress is likely to be fairly low, and it
may feel substantial pressure to approve the commitments already
made by the President.309

In

addition, treaties, especially multilat

eral treaties, may be more likely than domestic legislation to con
tain vague and aspirational language, making their effect on state
prerogatives harder to anticipate during the ratification process.310
Finally, the construction and implementation of many treaties are
delegated to international bodies that may lack domestic, let alone
state, accountability.311
Notwithstanding these objections to the political process argu
ment, it must be acknowledged that the Senate often has acted to
protect states' rights in the treaty context, especially with respect to
307. Friedman, supra note 2, at 1474.
308. Fast-track legislation allows the President to conclude trade agreements subject to
only limited debate and an up-or-down vote in Congress. See generally Harold Hongju Koh,
The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. lNTL. L. 143 (1992); C. O'Neal
Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned Into a
Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INTL. L. & EcoN. 2 (1994). There has been substantial debate in
Congress recently over whether to renew the President's fast-track authority. See, e.g.,
Sharon Schmickle, Stakes High in Debate on Latin American Trade, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIB., Jan. 3, 1998, at Al.
309. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 37, at 904-05 ("Today's Senate often confronts
completed agreements that it can reject or revise only on pain of international
embarrassment.").
310. See Jackson, supra note 306, at 339.
311. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1475-79. A good example is the World Trade Organi
zation. This Organization includes a Dispute Settlement Body that adjudicates trade disputes
among nations and passes judgment on national laws relating to trade. In two controversial
decisions, for example, it has declared invalid certain U.S. environmental regulations. See
Report of the Panel in United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, May 15, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998); Report of the Appellate Body in United States
- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, May 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 603
(1996).
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human rights treaties.312 Human rights agreements have, to date,
largely been concluded by means of treaties rather than executive
agreements. The Senate has been slow to consent to these treaties,
in part because of federalism concerns. And when it has consented,
the Senate has sought to protect state interests by declaring the
treaties to be non-self-executing and by attaching federalism
clauses.313 As Professor Peter Spiro has noted, there has been "a
consistent refusal [of the U.S. treaty makers] to displace state law
with international human rights treaty obligations."314
Of course, that the Senate has acted in a certain way is no guar
antee that it will continue to do so as its membership and relation
ship with the President change.315 Moreover, as discussed above,
human rights treaties are not the only international agreements that
raise federalism concerns, and it is far from clear that the Senate's
practices with regard to human rights treaties will be carried over
into other contexts. Indeed, if the GAIT and NAFfA agreements
are any indication, it cannot be assumed that the President will even
use the Article II treaty process for these other agreements.316 It
should also be noted that proponents of the nationalist view have
vigorously challenged the Senate's limitations on human rights trea
ties, so they may be in no position to rely on these limitations to
support their political process argument.317
More importantly, the limitations imposed by the Senate to date
on human rights treaties do not prevent a majority of Congress
from relying on the treaties, in conjunction with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, as a source of lawmaking power. Indeed, this is ex312. See, e.g., Whitton & Fowler, supra note 158, at 36-38.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 220-21.
314. Spiro, supra note 31, at 577.
315. Professor Spiro has suggested that the Senate's practice might itself now represent a
constitutional norm, in the spirit of a Bruce Ackerman-style constitutional amendment. See
id. at 576-78 & nn.32 & 37; cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 6-16 (1991) (explaining
the amendment theory). Although I find this suggestion unpersuasive, I do agree with Pro·
fessor Spiro that the Senate's practice is relevant to the question of whether to retain Hol
land. See Spiro, supra note 31, at 578. For powerful critiques of Professor Ackerman's
amendment theory, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, ch. 7 (1995), and Michael
J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's The
ory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REv. 759 (1992). See also Richard A. Posner,
This Magic Moment, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 6, 1998, at 32.
316. See supra text accompanying note 95.
317. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 14, at 518; Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification ofHuman
Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INTI.. L. 341 (1995); Harold
Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1824, 1828 n.24
(1998). See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 521-22
(1998) (discussing the limitations imposed by the Senate on human rights treaties and various
criticisms of them).
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Thus, as noted . above, a

number of commentators have suggested recently that Congress
rely on already-ratified treaties as the basis for overcoming limita
tions on its domestic lawmaking power.318 This is the process, for
example, recommended by Professor Neuman for reenactment of

the RFRA statute.319 In this context, there is no super-majority
protection in the Senate, so we are left with whatever political pro
cess checks exist in the majority of Congress - checks viewed by
the current Supreme Court and many commentators as insufficient
by themselves to protect the states.
C.

One-Voice Argument

A third argument against imposing federalism limitations on the
treaty power is that it would hamper the ability of the United States
to speak with one voice in international negotiations. According to
this one-voice argument, if the treaty power were limited by states'
rights, the Executive's ability to negotiate and conclude vital inter
national agreements would be severely compromised. As Professor
Neuman has argued, "[r]equiring the unanimous agreement of . .
.

all the states for ratification of any treaty that includes a provision
addressing 'local' concerns would greatly hamper American partici
pation in international treaty regimes."320
This one-voice argument has strong intuitive appeal. Foreign af
fairs, after all, concern the entire nation. Moreover, effective inter
national bargaining may well require that we have a national
representative with the power to make binding commitments. Con
sistent with this understanding, the Founders of the Constitution
envisioned, in the words of James Madison, that " [i]f we are to be
one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations."321 In addition, the Supreme Court has emphasized in a
number of cases the need for exclusive federal control over foreign
relations.322
318. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59, 64-69, 73-95, 99-106.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
320. Neuman, supra note 15, at 48. For a general discussion and partial critique of the
one-voice argument, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, Human Rights Litigation and the "One Voice"
Orthodoxy in Foreign Affairs, in WoRLD JUSTICE?: U.S. COURTS AND lNrERNATIONAL
HUMAN Rimrrs 23 {Mark Gibney ed., 1991).
321. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 114, No. 42 (James Madison), at 264.
322. See, e.g., Michelin Trre Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 {1976) ("[T]he Federal
Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments . . . . ); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) {describing "foreign affairs
and international relations" as "matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal
Government"); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("In respect of all intema"
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It is likely, however, that the one-voice metaphor has never
been very accurate. At the federal level, it is common for all three
branches of the government to be involved in foreign affairs mat
ters, preventing any single federal voice. As Professor Goldsmith
has observed, "[f]oreign relations law is replete with struggles be
tween the statute-makers, the treaty-makers, the President, and
sometimes the courts, for control of the federal foreign relations
voice."323 In addition, states are involved in a host of regulatory
activities that sometimes affect foreign affairs, such as criminal
prosecution of aliens, taxation of multinational corporations, and
adjudication of cases involving foreign parties or transactions.324
In any event, the intuitive appeal of the one-voice argument var
ies dramatically depending on the type of treaty-making involved.
It is strongest with respect to traditional treaty-making. Most of us
would agree, for example, that the Executive should not be ham
pered by federalism concerns when negotiating a peace treaty. But,
as we have seen, the nature of treaty-making has changed. It now
purports to regulate many subjects formerly considered domestic in
nature, especially in the human rights area. With respect to that
sort of treaty-making, the one-voice argument loses much of its in
tuitive appeal. It is not at all obvious, for example, that it is neces
sary or desirable that the country speak through the Executive with
respect to the regulation of religious freedom.
Whatever federalism limitations are imposed on the treaty
power, and I discuss some of the options below, they are likely to
be relevant almost entirely with respect to the new types of treaty
making, where the one-voice argument has less appeal. This might
not always have been the case. When states' rights were viewed
more expansively, and federal power viewed more narrowly, it is
possible that federalism limitations, if indiscriminately applied,
would have interfered with the nation's ability to speak with one
voice in international relations. Interestingly, during that same pe
riod of time, there was nevertheless support for limitations on the
treaty power.325 Today, with federalism at best a weak restraint on
federal power, any threat to flexibility posed by subjecting the
treaty power to federalism limitations is substantially lower.
tional negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear.").
323. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 1688.
324. See id. at 1634-39.
325. See supra section II.B.
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Moreover, as a political matter, treaty-making today is already
subject to federalism limitations on an ad hoc basis. Thus, for ex
ample, the Senate routinely attaches federalism clauses to human
rights treaties.326 These clauses have not hampered this country's
ability to conclude these treaties. Indeed, it may not have been po
litically possible to conclude these treaties without such clauses.321
Rejecting the nationalist view would simply give the force of law to
this practice without substantially interfering with the nation's abil
ity to conclude treaties.
The one-voice argument also has less doctrinal support than first
meets the eye. As noted above, the Court has pulled back from the
broad reasoning of decisions like Curtiss-Wright.328 Moreover, the
Court's one-voice statements have always been broader than the
Court's actual decisions, which have not in fact allowed the federal
government unfettered power in foreign affairs.329 Perhaps most
significantly, the Court recently sounded a formal retreat from a

Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board,330 the Court considered a challenge, under the dormant for
strong one-voice position. In

eign commerce clause, to the constitutionality of California's
"worldwide combined reporting" method for taxing multinational
corporations. In prior decisions, the Court had held that state tax
laws would be subject to dormant preemption if they interfered
with the federal government's ability to " 'speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign govern
ments.' "331 Relying on that proposition, the petitioners in Barclays
Bank pointed out that the California law had provoked enormous
diplomatic controversy with the United States' closest trading part
ners and had been opposed in numerous executive pronounce
ments.332 The Court nevertheless rejected their challenge to the
law, in large part because Congress had shown a willingness to tol
erate state taxation methods like the one at issue.333 Importantly,
the Court emphasized that the usual method in our constitutional
326. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
327. See Stewart, supra note 221, at 1189.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 279-84.
329. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103, 1192-93 (1990) (making this point and citing
relevant decisions).
330. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
331. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (quoting Miche
lin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
332. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 324-30.
333. See 512 U.S. at 324-28.
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system for overcoming state disuniformity is for Congress to enact a
statute within the scope of its Article I powers, and the Court indi
cated that it was unwilling to deviate from that approach just be
cause foreign affairs were involved.334 As other commentators have
noted, the Court in

Barclays Bank

largely repudiated the strong

"one voice" doctrine suggested in some of its earlier foreign com
merce clause decisions.335
·

A variation of this one-voice argument would be to claim that

the scope of the treaty power is a nonjusticiable political question.
Under the political question doctrine, courts

will

not review issues

where there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commit
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it."336 While there are indeed broad statements by the Supreme
Court suggesting that foreign affairs is a subject largely outside of
the scope of judicial review,337 the key problem here, once again, is
that the Court's statements are premised on the existence of a
bright line between foreign and domestic affairs. Once this line be
comes blurred, as it has in the treaty-making area, the justifications
for judicial abstention diminish. Even if the courts lack competence
and constitutional authority with respect to truly inter-national rela
tions, this may not be the case with respect to international agree334. See 512 U.S.

at 329-31.

335. See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 1705 ("As for the one-voice test in dormant foreign
Co=erce Clause cases: Barclays Bank effectively eliminated it."); Peter J. Spiro, The States
and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INTL. L. 121, 164 (1994) ("The
decision was a highly significant retreat in a line of foreign Commerce Clause rulings articu
lating a 'one voice' approach parallel to other forms of foreign affairs preemption."); Charles
Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45, 53
(1998) ("Ultimately, in the Barclays Bank case, the Supreme Court all but ended the era of
the Japan Line 'one voice' doctrine.").

�36. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Nixon v. United States, 506
224, 228 (1993) (quoting Baker).

U.S.

337. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) ("Matters relating 'to the conduct
of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as
to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."' (quoting Harisiades v. Shaugh
nessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952))); C. & S. Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948) ("Such decisions [concerning foreign policy] are wholly confided by our Constitu
tion to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative."); Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of the foreign relations of our
Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative - 'the polit
ical' - Departments of the Government . . . .") . This notion that the political question
doctrine should be applied broadly to cases involving foreign affairs has been criticized by
numerous commentators, including proponents of the nationalist view of the treaty power.
See generally FRANCK, supra note 2; Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?,
85 YALE LJ. 597 (1976); Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine, "
and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135 (1970).

November 1998]

449

Treaty Power and Federalism

ments that regulate the internal relationship between governments
and their citizens.

In

any event, the Court has made clear that "it is error to sup

pose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance."338 Rather, the political question
doctrine shields from judicial review only "those controversies
which revolve around policy choices and value determinations con
stitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or
the confines of the Executive Branch."339 States' rights, according
to the current Supreme Court, are very much within the scope of
proper judicial review.340 The Court also has specifically observed
that the

construction

of treaties and executive agreements is a

proper subject for judicial review, even if such construction might
have consequences for foreign relations.341 While a plurality of the
Court did conclude in

Goldwater

v.

_Carter342

that a challenge by

members of Congress to the President's unilateral termination of a
treaty presented a political question, it did so because the challenge
involved the respective powers of coordinate federal branches of
government.343 The scope of the treaty power, by contrast, involves
the powers of the federal government as a whole vis-a-vis the con
stituent state governments. As the Court has noted, "it is the rela
tionship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to
the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.' "344
For all of these reasons, neither the one-voice argument nor the
related political question doctrine justifies giving the treaty power
immunity from federalism restrictions. This is particularly true with
respect to the new forms of treaty-making that address issues that
in the past largely have been regulated by states. As for those trea
ties, the one-voice argument simply begs the question: the argu338. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
339. Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Socy., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
341. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 212; see also Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 230 ("As Baker
plainly held . . . the courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements,
and it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and ac
cepted task for the federal courts.").
342. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (plurality opinion).
343. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002. For an argument that judicial review is proper even
under these circumstances, see FRANCK, supra note 2, at 36-38.
344. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. It is also worth noting that the First Judiciary Act included a
provision specifically allowing challenges to the validity of treaties, suggesting that this issue
was not originally viewed as nonjusticiable. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73,
85-87 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)) (conferring federal court jurisdiction over
suits "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty").
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ment is premised on the need to protect federal prerogatives in
foreign affairs, yet whether the new forms of treaty-making are in
fact federal prerogatives is exactly what is at issue.
V.

PROTECTING AMERICAN FEDERALISM

As discussed above, the nationalist view of the treaty power is
unsupported by history, and its principal legal and policy justifica
tions are questionable. Consequently, to the extent that American
federalism continues to be worth protecting, there does not appear
to be any good justification for exempting the treaty power from
this protection. Indeed, at least some of the reasons for protecting
federalism, such as the desirability of having a check against the
centralization of power, would seem to be especially relevant to the
treaty power, which entails the centralization of power even further
away from the average U . S . citizen than d o es d omestic
legislation.345
The question remains, however,

how

federalism should be pro

tected. As we have seen, the political process does not appear by
itself to offer sufficient protection. Because there are two compo
nents of the nationalist view of the treaty power, there are, at least
in theory, two additional avenues for protecting federalism. The
treaty power could be subjected to some sort of a subject matter
test, or it could be subjected to structural federalism limitations. In
this Part, I consider both possibilities.
As I explain, the answer to this question may be different today
than it would have been in the past. Historically, it often was
assumed that the treaty power was appropriate only for certain
externally oriented subjects. As the distinction between foreign
and domestic affairs wanes, however, it becomes increasingly diffi
cult to maintain any meaningful subject matter limitation. As a re
sult, I argue that it makes more sense today to focus on structural
federalism limitations on the treaty power, and, for a variety of rea
sons, I argue that the treaty power should be subject to the same
federalism limitations that apply to Congress's legislative powers.
In other words, my argument is that the federal government should
not be able to use the treaty power (or executive agreement power)
to create domestic law that could not be created by Congress. To
the extent that this conclusion would require overruling

Holland,

I

345. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1477-81; Detlev Vagts, International Agreements, the
Senate and the Constitution, 36 CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 143, 154 (1997).
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argue that the justifications for stare decisis are weak in this
context.

A.

Reviving a Subject Matter Limitation

One option for protecting federalism in this context would be to
revive a subject matter limitation on the treaty power. After all,
such a limitation has substantial historical support and was rejected
by commentators only recently. Moreover, this limitation has never
been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court and thus presumably
could be revived without revisiting settled Supreme Court prece
dent. Indeed,

Holland itself arguably

assumed that there was such

a limitation on the treaty power.346
There are two possibilities here. The first would be to limit the
treaty power to matters usually the subject of treaties at the time
the Constitution was adopted. This was one of the limitations sug
gested by Jefferson.347 This suggested limitation has never received
much acceptance, however.348 Moreover, as a policy matter, this
limitation would seem to be highly undesirable. Not only would it
exclude U.S. participation in human rights treaties, it also would
presumably exclude U.S. participation in treaties relating to the en
vironment, terrorism, and private international law, to name a few
subjects. Moreover, it is doubtful that this limitation could be justi
fied even under a strict originalist interpretation of the Constitu
tion. There is no evidence that the Founders intended the treaty
power to be frozen to 1780s issues, and the inflexibility such a limi
tation would impose on the national government makes it highly
unlikely that the Founders would have had such an intent. And, of
course, other constitutional powers - such as the commerce power
- have not been limited in this fashion.349
The other possibility would be to limit the treaty power to mat
ters that are truly "international" in nature. This is the approach
suggested, for example, by Charles Evans Hughes and the

ment (Second).350

Restate

Although this approach may deserve further ex

ploration, it suffers from a substantial problem: Today, almost any
346. See supra text accompanying note 190-194.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 142-48.
348. See supra text accompanying note 147.
349. Cf. Louis Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116
U. PA. L. REv. 1012, 1021 (1968) ("[S]uch a limitation cannot be taken seriously . . . . There is
as little, or less, reason for limiting the treaty power to those matters about which nations
negotiated in the eighteenth century as there is for limiting the commerce power or the war
powers to the needs of that era.").
350. See supra text accompanying notes 227-30, 242-45.
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issue can plausibly be labeled "international." Given the globaliza
tion of trade, technology, and travel, among other things, nations
are indisputably connected to each other in a variety of ways. As a
result, "domestic" actions by nations are often matters of concern
to the international community. As Professor Tribe has observed,
"[w]ith global interdependence reaching across an ever broadening
spectrum of issues," any requirement that the treaty power be re
stricted to matters of international concern "seems unlikely to
prove a serious limitation."351
This may be true even in the area of human rights. Human
rights is, of course, a matter today of international negotiation and
agreement. Unlike some proponents of the nationalist view,352 I do
not find that fact alone dispositive of the question whether this sub
ject falls within the scope of the federal government's treaty power.

If it were dispositive, it would mean that the federal government's
power in this regard would be determined entirely by the interna
tional community rather than by domestic-law standards, something
at odds with this country's "dualist" approach to international
law.353 Nevertheless, it is difficult to dispute that, in this day and
age, how one nation treats its citizens has international effects.354
These effects may be direct and physical - for example, an influx
of refugees, or instability in the region. Or they may be more ab
stract and emotional - for example, a sense of moral outrage, or
an empathetic loss. Anyone who has observed recent events in
Tiananmen Square, Somalia, or Rwanda will find it difficult to deny
the existence of such effects.
351. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 228; see also, e.g., Friedman, supra note 2, at 1442 ("As the
world gets smaller, it will become more difficult to separate the domestic and foreign
spheres."); Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 1669-80 (discussing the waning of the distinction be
tween domestic and foreign affairs).
352. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 15, at 46.
353. Under the dualist approach, international and domestic law are treated as distinct,
the individual nation determines for itself when and to what extent international law is incor
porated into its legal system, and the status of international law in the domestic system is
determined by domestic law. See Loms HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW! CASES AND
MATERIALS 153-54 (3d ed. 1993). For a recent confirmation by the Supreme Court of this
country's dualist approach, see Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998), where the Court
made clear that the incorporation and enforcement of international law is subject to domestic
law standards, such as habeas corpus limitations, the last-in-time rule concerning conflicts
between treaties and federal statutes, and the Eleventh Amendment. See generally Curtis A.
Bradley, The Breard Case, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51
STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1999).
354. For a strong argument that human rights treaties involve matters of "international
concern," see Henkin, supra note 349; see also Myres S. McDougal & Gertrude C.K.
Leighton, The Rights ofMan in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Ra·
tional Action, 59 YALE LJ. 60 (1949) (arguing that human rights is a proper subject for
international regulation).
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But perhaps a focus on
would be a focus on

need.

effects is not the right test.

453
Another test

The question here might be whether the

issue requires international cooperation in order to be addressed.
This is, after all, how the Court described the migratory bird treaty
at issue in Holland. Under this test, human rights treaties might be
suspect, since their implementation involves action by individual
governments within their territories rather than cooperative ac
tion.355 But this line is fuzzy at best. It is arguable that there is in
fact a demonstrable need for cooperative international action to ad
dress even "domestic" issues such as human rights. Without recip
rocal agreements, along with international monitoring and other
enforcement mechanisms, many nations might well continue to en
gage in human rights abuses. Perhaps treaties are required to ob
tain results even here. To be sure, the proliferation of human rights
treaties has not eliminated human rights abuses in the countries
that have ratified them, but it is certainly possible that it has helped
improve conditions.
In any event, even if there were a workable distinction in theory
between international and domestic matters, it seems unlikely that
U.S. courts would feel competent to contradict the political
branches on this issue. It is far from clear, for example, what stan
dard the courts could use to draw such a line. Unlike some grants
of federal power, the wording of the treaty power does not itself
suggest any particular subject restriction. In construing the scope of
the Commerce Clause, for example, one might look to the move
ment of goods or the exchange of money.356 But other than the
form of the agreement itself, what is an attribute of a permissible
treaty? International law does not appear to offer any help. A
treaty is defined in international law simply as an agreement con
cluded between nation-states.357 The only subject matter limitation
under international law is that treaties cannot violate certain funda
mental jus

cogens norms, none of which is likely to have much rele-

355. Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States
Double Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2o 355, 359 (1998) ("If two nations are not inclined for
purely domestic reasons to provide a certain level of individual rights protection to their
citizens, they gain nothing from a mutual promise to provide greater protection to their
citizens.").
356. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) ("The possession of a gun
in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.").
357. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1), S. TREATY
Doc. No. 92-1 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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vance to U.S. treaties:358 Moreover, at least since the New Deal,
the Supreme Court has imposed few subject matter restraints even
on the federal powers that seem amenable to such a limitation.359
The difficulty of judicial line-drawing here is compounded by
the changing nature of the subject. What is considered "interna
tional" will undoubtedly vary over time, as world conditions and
relationships between nations change. As Professor Henkin has ex
plained: "What is of international concern, what affects American
foreign relations and is relevant to American foreign policy, what
matters the United States wishes to negotiate about, differ from
generation to generation, perhaps from year to year, with the ever
changing character of relations between nations."360 In other areas
of foreign affairs law, it is evident that the courts tend to defer to
the political branches and, indeed, attempt to shift decisionmaking
on such issues to those branches.361 They are particularly likely to
do so with respect to the scope of this country's international
relations.
A recent decision that illustrates this point is the Second Cir
cuit's decision in United States v. Lue. 362 The defendant in that
case, a foreign national, was convicted under the Hostage Taking
Act, a statute enacted as part of this country's implementation of
358. Jus cogens norms, also called "peremptory" norms, are rules of customary interna·
tional law "accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention, supra
note 357, art. 53; see also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715-17
{9th Cir. 1992) (discussing attributes of peremptory norms); Committee of United States Citi·
zens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 {D.C. Cir. 1988) (same); REsTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 13, § 102 cmt. k, reporters' note 6 (same). As these materials explain,
jus cogens norms concern only a few egregious international law violations, such as genocide,
war crimes, and torture.
359. See Kramer, supra note 46, at 1488.
360. Henkin, supra note 349, at 1025.
361. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994) (refusing
to preempt state tax on multinational corporations, despite protests from foreign govern·
ments, because "we leave it to Congress - whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's - to
evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy");
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 {1992) (refusing to invalidate abduction
of foreign suspect from Mexico at behest of United States officials, noting that "the decision
of whether respondent should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the [extradition]
Treaty, is a matter for the Executive Branch"); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
259 {1991) (refusing to apply Title VII extraterritorially and noting that "Congress, should it
wish to do so, may similarly amend Title VII and in doing so will be able to calibrate its
provisions in a way that we cannot"); see also Bradley, supra note 317, at 525-29 (making this
point in connection with the canon of construction that federal statutes are to be construed
not to violate international law); Bradley, supra note 92, at 550-61 (making this point in
connection with courts' use of the presumption against extraterritoriality).
362. 134 F.3d 79 {2d Cir. 1998).
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the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.363
The basis for the conviction was the defendant's attempted abduc
tion of a person in New York for the purpose of compelling the
victim's relatives to pay ransom. Consistent with the terms of the
Convention, the Hostage Taking Act applies even to domestic
kidnappings if done "in order to compel a third person or a govern
mental organization to do or abstain from doing any act," except
that the Act does not apply where "each alleged offender and each
person seized or detained are nationals of the United States, and
each alleged offender is found in the United States, unless the gov
ernmental organization sought to be compelled is the Government
of the United States."364 Since the defendant in this case was a for
eign national, this exception did not apply.
In response to the defendant's argument that the Act's regula
tion of domestic crimes was beyond the scope of the treaty power,
the court stated that "[t]he defendant relies far too heavily on a
dichotomy between matters of purely domestic concern and those
of international concern, a dichotomy appropriately criticized by
commentators in the field. "365 While acknowledging that there
"must be certain outer limits" to the scope of the treaty power, the
court explained that the Act's regulation of hostage taking could
easily be classified as a matter of international concern:
Whatever the potential outer limit on the treaty power of the Execu
tive, the Hostage Taking Convention does not transgress it. At the
most general level, the Convention addresses - at least in part - the
treatment of foreign nationals while they are on local soil, a matter of
central concern among nations. More specifically, the Convention ad
dresses a matter of grave concern to the international community:
hostage taking as a vehicle for terrorism.3 66

Given that the subject matter could plausibly be characterized as
one of international concern, the court believed that it was inappro
priate for the judiciary to second-guess the treaty-makers and
thereby "impinge upon the Executive's prerogative in matters per
taining to foreign affairs. "367
As this decision illustrates, the line between what is domestic
and what is international is difficult to define, the scope of what can
plausibly be labeled international has grown substantially in recent
363. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,081.
364. 18 u.s.c. § 1203 (1994).
365. Lue, 134 F.3d at 83 (citing the Restatement (Third), supra note 13).
366. Lue, 134 F.3d at 83.
367. Lue, 134 F.3d at 83.
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years, and courts as a result are unlikely to restrict the treaty power
much, if at all, based on this distinction. If federalism is to be pro
tected in the treaty context, another approach must be found.
B.

Parity with Federal Legislation

Another option for protecting federalism, and the option I
favor, would be to subject the treaty power to the same federalism
restrictions that apply to Congress's legislative powers. Under this
approach, the treaty power would not confer any additional regula
tory powers on the federal government, just the power to bind the
United States on the international plane. Thus, for example, it
could not be used to resurrect legislation determined by the
Supreme Court to be beyond Congress's legislative powers, such as
the legislation at issue in the recent
Printz decisions.368

New York, Lopez, Boerne,

and

As mentioned above, this approach was endorsed by George
Nicholas during the Virginia Ratifying Convention,369 Thomas Jef
ferson in his Manual on Parliamentary Practice,370 and the Supreme
Court in its 1836 decision, New

Orleans v. United States.371

It also is

essentially the law in Canada, where the treaty power has been con
strued not to give the national government legislative power over
matters reserved to the provinces.372

In addition to this historical and comparative-law support, there
are several conceptual and doctrinal reasons why it may make sense
today to subject treaties to the same federalism limitations as fed
eral statutes. First, unlike traditional treaties that were generally
bilateral and addressed the relations between nations, both the
form and substance of modern treaty law resembles domestic legis
lation. As discussed above, treaty law today regulates the relations
between nations and their citizens, it covers many of the same sub
jects as domestic law, and it is even made in a kind of legislative
way, through mechanisms such as multilateral drafting
conferences.373
368. See supra notes 47-59.
369. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
372. See Canada v. Ontario, 1937 App. Cas. 326, 354 (P.C. 1937) (appeal taken from
Can.); Friesen, supra note 188, at 1416. For a discussion of the scope of the treaty power in a
variety of federal systems, see IvAN BERNIER, lNrERNATIONAL LEGAL AsPEcrs OF FEDER·
ALISM 152-71 (1973).
373. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27; see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 13, § 102 cmt. f ("Multilateral agreements open to all states . . . are increasingly used for
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Second, as the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
recognized,374 the immunity of the treaty power from states'-rights
limitations is premised on the existence of a meaningful distinction
between the foreign and the domestic. Yet proponents of the na
tionalist view themselves, probably correctly, deny that we can con
tinue to make this distinction. Once that is denied, however, there
is a much stronger case, based upon the limited and enumerated
powers doctrine, for subjecting the treaty power to the same limita
tions that apply to other federal law.
Third, there is strong doctrinal support for the equal treatment
of federal statutes and treaties. Since at least the late 1800s, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that treaties and federal stat
utes have an equal status in the U.S. system, such that, in the case of
a conflict, the last in time is the controlling domestic law.375 This
well-settled equality of treaties and federal statutes supports treat
ing them as equal as well for federalism purposes.376 As the
Supreme Court has observed, its decisions "generally have re
garded treaties as on much the same plane as acts of Congress, and
as usually subject to the general limitations in the Constitution."377
Indeed, not treating them the same with respect to federalism limi
tations presents a doctrinal puzzle: If treaties can be made that go
beyond what Congress could do pursuant to its legislative powers,
then what happens to Congress's ability to supersede the treaty
with subsequent legislation? As William Mikell explained many
years ago:

If, however, a treaty were made which affected the reserved rights of
the states, it is, to say the least, doubtful if such a treaty could be
abrogated at all without the consent of the President, for Congress
having no power to pass a law, affecting the reserved rights of the
states, could enact no law either in affirmance or derogation of the
treaty.378
general legislation . . . . "); John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multi
lateral Solutions is Changing the Character of "International" Law, 42 KAN. L. REv. 605, 606
{1994) (describing the "proliferation of multilateral sets of rules"); Van Alstine, supra note
83, at 700 ("From a substantial perspective . . . the [private law] conventions have the look
and feel of standard federal statutes.").
374. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
375. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600-02 (1889); Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 {1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); see gener
ally Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853 (1987).
376. For an early argument to this effect, see James Harrington Boyd, The Treaty-Making
Power of the United States and Alien Land Laws in States, 6 CAL. L. REv. 279 {1918). See
also 5 MOORE, supra note 177, at 166.
377. United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 208 (1926).
378. Mikell, supra note 157, at 536-37.
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Further doctrinal support for imposing on the treaty power the
same federalism limitations as those imposed on Congress's Article
I powers can be found in cases involving the Eleventh Amendment.
This Amendment provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."379 This language refers only to suits by citizens and subjects,
but it has been held to apply to suits by foreign nations themselves
against U.S. states.380 Moreover, although the language refers to
jurisdiction, the Amendment has been read as embodying more
general principles of state sovereignty. 381

Importantly, the

Supreme Court has held that the federal government cannot over
come the Eleventh Amendment (as so defined) by means of Con
gress's

commerce

power.382

The

question remains,

however,

whether the federal government can overcome Eleventh Amend
ment imm�nity by means of its treaty power. The distinction made
in

Holland

and

Reid

between federalism limitations on Article I

powers and those on the treaty power at least raises the possibility
that the treaty power should be treated differently from the com
merce power with respect to the Eleventh Amendment.383 Re
cently, however, the Supreme Court made clear that treaty claims,
even when brought by foreign governments, are indeed subject to
the Eleventh Amendment.384
Notwithstanding this doctrinal support, a principal disadvantage
of this proposal is that it might require overruling at least some
portion of the

Holland decision.

The Court in

Holland was unclear

about many things, but one thing it did make clear is that the treaty
379. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI.
380. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934); see also Blatch
ford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 780-82 (1991) (relying on Monaco to support the exist
ence of Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits brought against states by Indian tribes).
381. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
382. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
383. For commentators making this argument, see, for example, Lori Fisler Damrosch,
The Justiciability of Paraguay's Claim of Treaty Violation, 92 AM. J. INTL. L. 697 (1998); and
Jordan J. Paust, Breard and Treaty-Based Rights Under the Consular Convention, 92 AM. J.
lNrr.. L. 691 (1998).
384. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1356 (1998). Before this decision, a number
of lower courts had reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Republic of Paraguay v. Allen,
134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998); United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir.
1997). The Restatement (Third) similarly expresses the view that the treaty power is subject
to the Eleventh Amendment. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 302 reporters'
note 3.
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power is not subject to the same federalism restrictions as Con
gress's lawmaking powers.385 My proposal's deviation from

land,

Hol

however, is not as great as it first might appear. The specific

holding of the

Holland

decision - that the migratory bird treaty

was a proper exercise of the treaty power - presumably would be
preserved, given the much narrower scope of the Tenth Amend
ment today. Moreover, as discussed above, although

Holland

has

been construed as giving the treaty power complete immunity from
federalism limitations, the decision itself can be read much more
narrowly.386 Recent confirmation of this can be found in the brief
filed by the Clinton administration in the recent Breard case stating
that there are in fact federalism limits on the national government's
power to enforce treaties.387

In

any event, the Supreme Court has said that stare decisis car

ries less weight with respect to constitutional decisions, since Con
gress

cannot

overturn

them.388

This

is

especially

so

when

fundamental assumptions in the first decision no longer hold

Holland.
Holland was decided looks very different
Court in Holland assumed that the power of

true.389 That is exactly the case with respect to
The world in which
from our own. The

Congress to regulate interstate commerce was relatively narrow.
As a result, the Court thought it necessary that the treaty power be
more expansive than the commerce power, in order to address
"matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an
act of Congress could not deal with."39° Today, of course, Con
gress's commerce power is extremely broad, and it is likely to re
main s o n otwithstanding the Supreme Court's renewed
commitment to federalism.

Holland

also was decided at a time when customary interna

tional law, rather than treaties, was the dominant form of interna
tional law.391 Since then, however, there has been a proliferation of
385. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
386. See supra text accompanying notes 203-07. Another area of doctrinal support is in
the area of separation of powers. As discussed above, it is generally accepted that the treaty
power is subject to the same separation of powers limitations as Congress's legislative pow
ers. See supra text accompanying notes 285-86.
387. See supra text accompanying note 81.
388. For a recent statement by the Court to this effect, see Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct.
1997, 2016 (1997).
389. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 284 (1997) (emphasizing, in overturn
ing a prior antitrust decision, the need for "recognizing and adapting to changed circum
stances and the lessons of accumulated experience").
390. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
391. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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treaties, as well as the rise of numerous multilateral treaty regimes,
such that treaties "have become the principal vehicle for making
law for the international system."392 This shift from custom to code
has meant that international law is now more specific and regulates
a substantially wider range of subjects.

As Professor Mark Janis has

observed, today "[v]irtually every human activity is to some degree
the object of some treaty."393 These changes have thus substan
tially heightened the significance of the treaty power in this
country.
The Court in

Holland

also appeared to assume that treaties

would deal only with matters concerning truly inter-national rela
tions. Thus, the Court emphasized that the treaty there concerned
a problem that "can be protected only by national action in concert
with that of another power."394 Since then, however, we have seen
the rise of international human rights law, which regulates the rela
tions between nations and their citizens. Among other things, this
means that there is today a significantly greater overlap and poten
tial for conflict between treaty law and U.S. domestic law.
Finally, the Court in Holland placed great emphasis on the dele
gation language of Article II,395 something problematic on its own
terms but especially so given that most international agreements
concluded by the President today take the form of executive agree
ments rather than Article II treaties. Even if it were true that the
treaty clause in Article II was intended to delegate unlimited law
making power to the federal government, subject only to certain
process protections, this clause has become much less relevant to
American treaty-making.

In sum, there is a strong case - based on history,

doctrine, and

policy - for subjecting the treaty power to the same federalism
limitations that apply to Congress's legislative powers. This ap
proach would involve overruling some of the reasoning in

Holland,

but that reasoning has become questionable in light of changes in
both the nature of treaty-making and the scope of federal legislative
power. It is particularly questionable if, contrary to the Court's ap
parent assumption in

Holland,

there is no subject matter limitation

on the treaty power. Importantly, this proposal would not interfere
substantially with the treaty power. It might preclude some of the
broadest intrusions on state power, such as Professor Neuman's re392. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, pt. I, introductory note, at 18.
393. MARK W. JANis, AN lNTRooucnoN TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2d ed. 1993).
394. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
395. 252 U.S. at 432.
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cent proposal concerning RFRA, but it would leave the political
branches with substantial flexibility to conclude and implement in
ternational agreements in the national interest.

CONCLUSION
The treaty power in this country is a power to malrn supreme
federal law. For much of our history, courts, commentators, and
government officials have assumed that this power is limited by
subject matter, states' rights, or both.

In

recent years, however,

conventional wisdom has denied any such limitations. The result of
this view is that the treaty makers have essentihlly unlimited power
vis-a-vis the states. Such unlimited power, however, is inconsistent
with a central principle of American federalism - that the national
government's powers are limited and enumerated. This inconsis
tency is particularly significant today, in light of the rapidly ex
panding nature of this country's treaty commitments.
Faced with this conflict between foreign affairs orthodoxy and
federalism, we could, of course, abandon our commitment to pro
tecting federalism. Perhaps the increased globalization and interde
pendence of nations renders federalism obsolete.

On the other

hand, these forces might actually increase the desire for local de
mocracy and experimentation and thus make federalism even more
attractive.396

In any event, we must make a choice.

As we continue

with what is in essence an "international New Deal," we must de
cide whether federalism is worth preserving. If it is, the nationalist
view of the treaty power should be reconsidered.
This is not the only foreign affairs issue that may require recon
sideration. As I have explained, the nationalist view of the treaty
power is but one example of an approach that could be called "for
eign affairs exceptionalism."

This approach, which is largely a

product of academic and judicial thinking during the 1920s through
the 1940s, distinguishes sharply between domestic and foreign af
fairs. As we enter the next century, that distinction, and the foreign
affairs exceptionalism that it justifies, will become increasingly diffi
cult to maintain.

396. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1443 ("As we become subject to regulation that de
velops farther and farther from our grasp, there will be a strong incentive to reinvigorate
local and state government, in order to return control over other aspects of our lives to
governments quite close to home.").

